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Aboriginal Title: The Special
Case Of California
Bruce S. Flushman*
Joe Barbieri**
". .. and then one day a white man came and he had the right
paper so we had to go." '
The land title system that has developed in California is unique
to the United States in the treatment of what is known as the "Indian
right of occupation" or aboriginal title.2 Continued, well-publicized
and highly emotional Indian title litigation in Maine,3 other north-
eastern states,4 the plains states,5 and the West6 establishes both the
widespread existence and currency of the potent effect of claims of
unextinguished aboriginal title. In both the public and private sectors,
landholding and land management entities are being forced to re-
* Deputy Attorney General, State of California, A.B., 1965, J.D. 1968, University of
California, Berkeley.
** Deputy Attorney General, State of California, A.B., 1973, Northwestern University,
J.D. 1978, University of California, Berkeley. The opinions set forth are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Attorney General.
1. Helen Knopf, Memories, ATLANTic MONTHLY.
2. The terms "Indian right of occupancy," "Indian title", and "aboriginal title" are
used interchangeably herein.
3. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D.
Me. 1974), aff'd 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (hereinafter Passamaquoddy 1)
4. E.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Mashpee Tribe
v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1977); Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v.
Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern
Rhode Island Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
5. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Oglala Sioux Tribe
v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983).
6. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans Canada Enterprise, Inc., 713 F.2d 455 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Pend Oreille County. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 585 F. Supp. 606
(E.D. Wash. 1984); Suquamash Tribe v. Aam, No. 82-1582 (W.D. Wash.); United States ex
rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, No. 84-4144 DWW; (JRX), (U.S., C.D. Cal), appeal pending.
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examine their bases of title in anticipation of possible challenges based
on claimed aboriginal title.
This article examines the question of whether any unextinguished
aboriginal title remains in California. The article will explore first,
the origin of the doctrine of aboriginal title and the protections devised
to ensure the preservation of the doctrine. Second, the discussion will
focus on the history of the relations of the United States with Cali-
fornia Indians concerning land title and the development of the land
title system in California as the system related to Indian title. Finally,
the article will explore the means of extinguishing aboriginal title and
discuss how the application of the different methods of extinguishing
aboriginal title relate to aboriginal title in California.
ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL
TITLE AND THE NON-INTERCOURsE ACT
Aboriginal or Indian title is a permissive right of occupancy re-
cognized by the sovereign in the original possessors of the land.7 In
Johnson v. McIntosh, the classic statement of this principle, Chief
Justice Marshall explained the theory of aboriginal title:
In the establishment of these relations [between the discoverer and
natives], the rights of the original inhabitants were in no instance
entirely disregarded; but were, necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives,
as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves;
and claimed, and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate domi-
nion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives.
These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy . . .
7. See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-4, 588 (1823); Tlingit
& Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 389 F.2d 778, 782 (Ct. Cl. 1968) Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma 397 U.S. 620, 623 (1970); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. den., sub. nom. Wilson v. United States, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); Inupiat Com-
munity of Arctic Slope v. United States, 680 F.2d 122, 129 (Ct. Cl. 1982) cert. den. 459
U.S. 969 (1982).
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Conquest gives a title which the courts of the Conqueror cannot
deny.8
As later described by the Court, Indian title means " mere posses-
sion not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress . . . This
is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which
the sovereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties
but which right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully
disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable
obligation to compensate the Indians." 9
In contrast to aboriginal title is the concept of "recognized" title.
Recognized title exists where Congress, through statute or treaty, grants
a right of permanent occupancy within a specifically defined territory. °
The doctrine of recognized title requires demonstration of an affir-
mative intention by Congress to set aside the particular lands for per-
manent occupancy by Indians."
Whether an assertion of Indian ownership of land is made under
the guise of Indian title or recognized title is of critical importance
in at least two respects. The first goes to the factual proof of owner-
ship of the lands. When a claim is made that land is owned by virtue
of recognized title, the crucial element of proof is a demonstration
of the affirmative government intent to recognize title; proof of the
actual metes and bounds of the specific land owned by Indians will
be readily found in the statute, treaty or executive order recognizing
title. In contrast, affirmative government recognition such as approval
by statute or other formal governmental action is not a prerequisite
to a claim under aboriginal title.'2 Instead, the proof of an aboriginal
file claim requires the difficult, lengthy and costly showing of
immemorial possession of the land to which the claim is made. 3 The
8. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574, 588.
9. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
10. See id. at 277; Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 936
(Ct. Cl. 1959); Sac & Fox Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States 315 F.2d 896, 897 (Ct. Cl.
1963), cert. den. 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556, 563 (Ct. Cl.
1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1015 (1975).
11. Sac & Fox Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 315 F.2d at 897; Strong, 518 F.2d at 563.
12. See United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) [hereinafter San-
ta Fe]; Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cls. 487, 492 (1967); Oneida Indian
Nation, 414 U.S. at 669; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 105 S.Ct.
1245, 1252 (1985); United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Narragansett Tribe, 418 F. Supp. at 807.
13. For example, the Indian Claims Commission, created to determine pre-1946 Indian
claims against the United States, (Indian Claims Commission Act, Act of August 3, 1946, Pub.
Law No. 726, 60 Stat. 1049, codified at 25 U.S.C. §70 et seq.), was scheduled to complete
its work in five years but processed claims until disestablished in 1978. (Act of October 8,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465, 90 Stat. 1990, as amended by Act of July 20, 1977, Pub. L. No.
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claimant must show actual, exclusive and continuous possession of
the land claimed."
The second critical distinction between recognized and aboriginal
title involves whether there has been a "taking". Land owned by virtue
of recognized title which is appropriated by the government has been
taken under the fifth amendment, and compensation must be paid
to Indians holding under a claim of recognized title.'" Crucially, since
many years may have passed since the taking, payment for a taking
made under the fifth amendment includes an award for interest.'
6
As noted above, however, the United States may terminate aboriginal
title held by Indians without any legally enforceable obligation to com-
pensate the Indians for the "taking."' 7 Any compensation paid for
the appropriation of Indian occupancy rights is, in a sense,
"gratuitous" and allowed only pursuant to a clear statutory directive.'"
As Johnson and progeny demonstrate, once the United States
asserted dominion over Indian lands, the future right of the Indians
to occupancy was subject to the absolute control of the federal govern-
ment. This absolute control is composed of two elements that are
mirror images of one another.' 9 First, the United States has the obliga-
tion to protect the Indian right of occupancy against intrusion from
95-69, 91 Stat. 273.) An example of how an aboriginal claim is proved can be found in Thompson
v. United States, 8 Ind. Cls. Comm. 1, 31-39 (1959) (claim of the Indians of California); see
also Tee-Hit-Ton, 384 U.S. at 285-288.
14. See Snake or Paiute Indians v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 543, 552 (Ct. CI. 1953);
Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 315 F.2d at 903; Strong, 518 F.2d at 560.
15. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 (1942); Chippewa Indians of Min-
nesota v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375 (1937); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S.
476, 497 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1935); see Tee-Hit-Ton,
348 U.S. at 285; Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 690 (Ct. Cl. 1968);
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 415, n.29.
16. See Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 299 U.S. at 497; Indians of California v. United States,
98 Ct. Cl. 583, 600 (1942), cert. den. 319 U.S. 764 (1943); Fort Berthold Reservation, 390
F.2d at 690; Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 424.
17. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415 n.29.
18. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284; Tlingit and Haida Indians, 389 F.2d at 789. The
distinction that compensation for the "taking" of aboriginal title is required only where authorized
by Congress was clarified by the Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton. In United States v. Alcea
Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946), the Court had held that eleven Indian tribes suing
under a jurisdictional act were entitled to compensation for loss of their aboriginal title lands.
Denying a distinction existed between original Indian title and recognized Indian title, the Court
noted that "admitting the undoubted power of Congress to extinguish original Indian title compels
no conclusion that compensation need not be paid." Id. at 47. The Tillamooks case was
distinguished in Tee-Hit-Ton because it arose under a jurisdictional act specifically authorizing
payment and therefore the quoted language was treated as dicta. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 282.
19. This duality has been described as follows:
[I]t is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as trustee for the benefit of the
Indians, exercising its plenary powers over Indians and their property, as it thinks is in their
best interests, and (2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, taking the Indians' pro-
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third persons. Second, the United States has the absolute and un-
fettered right to extinguish aboriginal title without compensation.
The Indian Non-Intercourse Act has been part of the law of the
United States since the law was first enacted in 1790.20 The Non-
Intercourse Act gives statutory recognition to both elements of the
federal power of the federal government over Indian title. The Non-
Intercourse Act prohibits the unfair, improvident, or improper Indian
disposition of Indian-owned or possessed lands to parties other than
the United States without the consent of Congress, and authorizes
the federal government to vacate any such disposition made without
consent.2" The Non-Intercourse Act, however, does not apply to trans-
actions in which the United States is dealing with the Indians. 21 This
is an acknowledgement of the absolute and complete control of the
United States over aboriginal title.23
The Maine litigation provides the most graphic example of the effect
of the Non-Intercourse Act. The plaintiff tribes in that litigation sought
to recover 12.5 million acres of aboriginal land given in exchange
for some 23,000 acres under the terms of a 1794 treaty executed with
Massachusetts, the predecessor state of Maine, some four years after
the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act.24
perty within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In any given situation
in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian people, it must have acted either in one
capacity or the other. Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear them both at the same time.
Fort Berthold Reservation, 390 F.2d at 691.
20. Indian Non-Intercourse Act (1790) 1 Stat. 137, Ch. 33. For a history of the Act see
Passamaquoddy I, 388 F. Supp. at 652, n. 1. Now set forth in the United States Code, the
Act provides:
No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant
to the Constitution. Every person who, not being employed under the authority of
the United States, attempts to negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or in-
directly, or to treat with any such nation or tribe of Indians for the title or purchase
of any lands by them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of $1,000. The agent
of any State who may be present at any treaty held with Indians under the authority
of the United States, in the presence and with the approbation of the commissioner
of the United States appointed to hold the same, may, however, propose to, and
adjust with, the Indians the compensation to be made for their claim to lands within
such State, which shall be extinguished by treaty.
25 U.S.C. §177.
21. F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960); County of Oneida, 105
S.Ct. at 1250; Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 667; Joint Trib. Coun. of Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377 (1st Circ. 1975) (hereinafter Passamaquoddy 11); Nar-
ragansett Tribe, 418 F. Supp. at 803.
22. See F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. at 120.
23. Id.
24. See McLaughlin, Giving It Back To The Indians, 239 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 70 (Feb.,
1977).
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The simple but powerful argument made by the tribes was that the
purchase of the lands by the state was invalid since the purchase was
not made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.25 The real issue in the Maine cases, however, was whether
the United States had any obligation to the Indians by virtue of the
Non-Intercourse Act. Both the District Court and First Circuit held
that the United States had a trust responsibility with respect to the
protection of aboriginal title.26 Thus, the United States was obliged
to do whatever was necessary to protect Indian land whenever the
government became aware Indian rights had been violated." Moreover,
the United States was in a fiduciary capacity with respect to protec-
tion of aboriginal title and this fiduciary capacity included a duty
to investigate and take such action as may be warranted.28 The First
Circuit did not reach the question of whether the trust relationship
required the United States to sue in behalf of the tribes,2 9 nor did
the court reach the substantive issue of whether Congress had acquired
or ratified the land acquisitions of the state from the Indians3 0 The
action that the United States subsequently filed on behalf of the Indians
was eventually settled3' and some $81,500,000 was appropriated to
implement the settlement. 2
The typical legal and equitable defenses such as statute of limita-
tions, laches, adverse possession, estoppel by sale, operation of state
law and public policy are not available" in actions brought to redress
violations of the Non-Intercourse Act.2 4 The Non-Intercourse Act
25. See Passamaquoddy I, 388 F. Supp. at 652.
26. Id. at 662; Passamaquoddy HI, 528 F.2d at 379.
27. See Passamaquoddy I, 388 F. Supp. at 662.
28. See Passanquoddy II, 528 F.2d at 380.
29. Id. at 370.
30. Id. at 380-81.
31. See Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, P. L. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785, 25
U.S.C. §1721 et seq.
32. See 25 U.S.C. §1724.
33. See County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1252; Schaghticoke Tribe, 423 F.Supp. at 784-85;
Narragansett Tribe of Indians, 418 F. Supp. at 803-06; Oneida Indian Nation of New York
v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d 525, 537 (2nd Cir. 1983) aff'd, County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct.
at 1245. In the Oneida County case the also unsuccessful contention was made that no private
right of action was available to enforce the provisions of the Non-Intercourse Act. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York v. Oneida County, 719 F.2d at 532-537. Although it did not reach
that issue, the Supreme Court narrowly (5-4) held that the Indians had a federal common law
right to sue to protect their aboriginal land rights. County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1252.
34. To establish a prima facie violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, it must be shown
that the plaintiff is or represents an Indian "tribe" within the meaning of Act; the parcels
of land at issue are covered by the Act as tribal land; the United States has never consented
to the alienation of the tribal land; and the trust relationship between the United States and
the tribe, which is established by coverage of the Act, has never been terminated or abandon-
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simply restrains acquisition of Indian land by third parties other than
in the manner prescribed in the Act." Furthermore, the argument
that aboriginal title alone does not mean a "title" having the protec-
tion of the Non-Intercourse Act is "without merit" .36 Therefore, the
most likely defenses available in Non-Intercourse Act litigation will
be attempts to show either that the Indian tribe or Congress acquiesced
in the alienation of aboriginal lands, that the Non-Intercourse Act
was not intended to cover the particular land in dispute, or that the
United States itself terminated Indian title.37
As will be seen, California land titles have been rendered immune
from the kind of ancient Indian land claims that have created such
consternation in the Eastern United States. Critically, unlike the history
of Indian title transactions in the eastern states, the extinction of Indian
title in California is directly traceable to the conduct and dealings
by the United States with California Indians and their land title.
THE UNITED STATES AND CALIFORNIA INDIAN TITLES
Prior to the arrival of the first Spanish expeditions in 1766,
approximately 100,000 to 300,000 Indians lived in the area that was
to become the State of California. 3  The Indians, who lived in a
"primitive and aboriginal condition," were divided into about 500
ed. See generally, Passamaquoddy II, 528 F.2d at 375-380: Narragansett Tribe, 418 F. Supp.
at 803; see Mashpee Tribe, 427 F. Supp. at 902; James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 72 (Ist Cir.
1983) cert. den. 104 S.Ct. 2397 (1984).
35. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d. 321, 334, (9th Cir. 1956)
cert. den. 352 U.S. 988 (1957); United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th
Cir. 1938).
36. Narragansett Tribe of Indians, 418 F. Supp. at 807.
37. For example, Maine's defenses to the claims by the Indian tribes were, first, that the
Act was never intended to apply to Maine; second, whether the Act is applicable or not, the
aboriginal possession of the Maine Tribes was extinguished before 1790; third, in any event,
Congress, in admitting Maine to the Union in 1820 with knowledge of treaties between Maine's
parent state, Massachusetts, and the tribes, approved those treaties as a matter of law. Letter
of Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General of Maine, June 20, 1977, pp. 1-2. See Oneida Indian
Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d at 539 (claim of subsequent federal ratifica-
tion). Given the narrowness of recent rulings in this area, County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at
1245, a time bar may be successfully asserted in an appropriate case. Id. at 1266 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a case in which the Fourth Circuit
upheld a Non-Intercourse Act claim despite the claim that Congress, by later action, had ratified
the action of the State. Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State of S.C., 718 F.2d 1291 (4th
Cir. 1983), aff'd (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc) 740 F.2d 305, cert. granted (1985) 44 S. Ct. Bull. 3023.
38. Claims of California Indians: Hearings on H.R. 491 Before the Committee on Indian
Affairs, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1928) (Statement of Congressman Lea) (hereinafter 1928
Hearings) (200,000 estimated population); Castillo, The Impact of Euro-American Exploration
and Settlement in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 99 (R. Heizer, ed., Smithsonian,
1978) (nearly 300,000 unconquered natives); Cook, Historical Demography in Id. at 91 (310,000,
although estimates range from 133,000 to 260,000).
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separate and distinct bands, tribes and rancherias, and enjoyed the
sole use, occupancy and possession of all the lands in the state,
undisturbed by any European power.39 While many of the Indian
groups were nomadic, estimates show that between 45 and 500 tribes
or tribelets'" lived in defined (albeit de facto) areas of the state."
These more or less definite boundaries were known and respected by
other Indians.42
As part of the conquest of the New World, Spain exerted domi-
nion over the California territory, and directed the establishment of
twenty-one missions on the western coast of the territory. 3 Some
Indians, loosely called Mission Indians, 44 became "civilized" and lived
and worked under the protection of the missionaries. 4 However, the
greater part of the state was left to the undisturbed occupancy of
the Indian inhabitants, comprising about four-fifths of the Indians
then living in the state.46
After Mexico revolted and established independence from Spain in
1824, the California Indians became subject to Mexican rule. 4 The
missions were secularized in 1834, and the Mexican government super-
vised the formation of communal villages on mission lands.48 Some
of the Indians received land grants from the Mexican government. 9
In 1848, under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that
concluded the Mexican-American War, the Mexican government ceded
39. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cis. at 586; Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 3.
40. See KROEBER, HANDBOOK OF CALIFORNIA INDIANS (Bull. 78, Bur. Of Ethnology, Smithso-
nian, 1928) (reprint, Dover, 1976) (map inside front cover, Stock and Tribes); Heizer, Treaties
in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 703 (R. Heizer, ed. Smithsonian 1978); Thomp-
son, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 31.
41. See 1928 Hearings, supra note 38, at 19; Castillo, supra note 38, at 101.
42. See Thompson, 8 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 6.
43. See Castillo, supra note 38, at 100-102.
44. See Shipek, History of Southern California Mission Indians in 8 HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS 610 (R. Heizer, ed., Smithsonian, 1978); HORNBECK, CALIFORNIA PATTERNS:
A GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL ATLAS 42-49 (Mayfield, 1983).
45. See Report on the Subject of Land Titles In California (April 10, 1850) 31st Cong.,
1st Sess., Ser. 589, Doc. 18, p. 33 (hereinafter Jones Report); KENNEY, HISTORY AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT, CLAIMS OF CALIFORNIA INDIANS 9 (State Printing Office, 1944); Castillo, supra
note 38, at 102.
46. See Castillo, supra note 38, at 107; HooPEs, DOMESTICATE OR EXTERMINATE 18
(Redwood Coast Public 1975) (hereinafter HooPEs); HORNBECK, supra note 44, at 35.
47. See Castillo, supra note 38, at 104.
48. Id. at 105; Report of H.W. Halleck (1849) 31st Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. 573, Doc. 17,
p. 127-128 (hereinafter Halleck Report); Letter Lt. H.W. Halleck to Col. J.D. Stevenson (1848)
31st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 573, Doc. 17, pp. 576- 579; Jones Report, supra note 45, at 11-20,
33-34.
49. Jones Report, supra note 45, Exhibit No. 33, pp. 95-114; see, e.g., Sunol v. Hepburn, 1
Cal. 254, 256 (1850); Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal. 372, 374-75 (1859); Hicks v. Coleman,
25 Cal. 122-23 (1864); United States v. Armijo, 72 U.S. 444-45 (1866).
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to the United States a great area of land including the land which
would later comprise the State of California."0
During the period of Spanish and Mexican sovereignty, numerous
grants of large areas of land in the ceded territory were made to private
citizens by those governments; several hundred such grants were for
lands within the present boundaries of California.' Under the eighth
article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States expressly
recognized the land grants made by the prior sovereigns and agreed
to legitimate title to such lands.52
Pursuant to the terms of Articles VIII and IX of the Treaty, the
United States agreed to maintain Mexican citizens" residing in the
ceded territories in the previous enjoyment of their liberty and
property.54 To effectuate the intent of the Treaty to honor the land
laws of the prior sovereign, the United States established procedures
to review the legitimacy of the grants to private persons made by
the prior sovereign."
In practice, however, the rush of events in California started by
the discovery of gold in 1848 spelled the doom of any attempt to
50. See 9 Stat. 922. A map attached to the treaty depicted the area ceded. 5 MILLER,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Dept. of State Pub.
No. 1017, 1937).
51. Jones Report, supra note 45, at 95-114 (Exhibit 33); Thompson, 8 Ind. Cls. Comm.
at 6. 553 Spanish and Mexican land grants, aggregating 8,859,135.60 acres were validated and
confirmed by the United States pursuant to the Private Land Claims Act, discussed Id. at
7. An additional 23 grants, totalling 42,469.73 acres, were confirmed and granted to the California
Mission Indians. Id. The total land encompassed in the State of California is about 100,000,000
acres. HORNBECK, supra note 45, at 98.
52. See 9 Stat. 922, 929-930. This had been the practice of the United States in previous
territorial acquisitions. See, e.g., United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 706 (1832);
Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 735 (1835); New Orleans v. United States,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 732 (1836); see Botillier v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 250-52 (1889).
The practice of the United States is detailed in "A Report on the California Land Commis-
sion," 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Ex. Doc. 1, Ser. 746, 1172 (1854).
53. The Treaty distinguished between "Mexicans" and "Indians." For instance, the
sacredness of the obligation to the Mexicans would "not be lost sight of" by the United States
"when providing the removal of the Indians" from the territories. 9 Stat. 932. And "special
care was to be taken not to place Indian occupants under the necessity of seeking new homes."
Id. Therefore the Treaty arguably did not guarantee the Indians the same broad protections
received by the Mexican citizens resident in the State. But United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 525, 539-40 (1854), held that Indians were citizens of Mexico. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the acts passed to implement the provisions of the Treaty have been construed
to extend the protection of previous enjoyment of liberty and property to Indians and Mex-
icans alike. See id.; Armijo, 72 U.S. at 448-49; Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 492 (1901);
see KENNEY, supra note 45 at 9; Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cls. at 586; United States v.
Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1983) (Dann 11), rev'd on other grounds (1985), 105 S.
Ct. 1058.
54. Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 9 Stat. at 929-30.
55. E.g., Barker, 181 U.S. at 492-99; HooPEs, supra note 46, at 8.
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treat California Indian titles with the consideration that was accorded
Indian titles in other parts of the United States. Not only did the
population of California increase dramatically,5 6 but this increased
population, hungry for easy wealth, immediately clashed with the
Indians.57
Uncertain about the nature and state of land title in the newly
acquired territory, 8 and recognizing the need for secure land titles, 9
the federal government commissioned several reports to be prepared
on the subject.6 0 Although written from an ill-concealed bias against
Indians, 6' these reports concluded, based on their investigation of
Spanish and Mexican authorities, that the Spanish and Mexican govern-
ments did not attribute any value to Indian title. The laws enacted
by the Spanish and Mexican governments recognized the rights of
the Indians only to the lands they possessed.62 This was not a
56. See HORNBECK, supra note 44 at 64-65.
57. "As adventurers from every state and a dozen nations scrambled to reap the golden
harvest, law and order broke down. The white and Mexican Californians watched with anguish
as the newcomers seized their lands, murdered and hanged one another, and trod over the
local Indians in the race for gold." J.M. BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 471- 472 (1982)
. ... While there were few white people in California, gold was discovered in 1848, followed
by invading waves of gold seekers . . . Few, if any, rights of the Indians that interfered or
stood in the way of gold seekers were respected . . . . The Indians at peace in the land of
their fathers suddenly found themselves without any security or life or respected rights of pro-
perty or any place that they could with confidence call home." 1928 Hearings, supra note
38, at 23; Castillo, supra note 38, at 107-108; Letter Brig. Gen. B. Riley to Lt. Col. J. Hooker
(1849) 31st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 573, Doc. 17, p. 925-926; Letter, Brig. Gen. B. Riley to
Maj. Gen. R. Jones (1849) at Id. p. 790.
58. See Peralta v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 434, 439 (1885); Botiller, 130 U.S. at 244.
59. Id.
The permanent prosperity of any new country is identified with the perfect security
of its land titles . . . . Indeed, there can be no greater drawback to the prosperity
of a country . . . than disputed land titles. Prudent men will be deterred from
emigrating to a State . . . where they cannot obtain indisputable title, and must
consequently be exposed to the danger of strife and litigation in respect to the soil
on which they dwell. Any uncertainty respecting the security of land titles arrests
all valuable improvement, because no prudent man will expend his means for this
purpose while there is a danger that another may deprive him of the fruit of his labors.
Letter, James Buchanan to William V. Vorhies (1848) 31st Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. 573, Doc.
No. 17, pp. 8-9. This letter conveyed the views of President Taylor to be made known to
the inhabitants of California. Id. at 6; Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1908 (1850).
60. See HooPEs, supra note 46, at 5-15; Jones Report, supra note 45; Halleck Report,
supra note 48; T. Butler King, Report on California (1850) 31st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 577,
Doc. 59 (hereinafter King Report). Jones was the son-in-law of Sen. Thomas Hart Benton.
ROBINSON, LAND IN CALIFORNIA 91 (U.C. Press 1948). Jones appeared as counsel for many
California land claimants. Id. at 98. Jones' son was the famed dean of the School of
Jurisprudence at the University of California. Id. Halleck later gained somewhat uncertain fame
as Lincoln's Chief of Staff during the Civil War. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, MACROPEDIA
987. Indian agents also made reports on the state of Indian life and title. Report of the Secretary
of Interior (1853) 33rd Cong., Spec. Sess., Ser. 688, Doc. 4, 34-45.
61. King Report, supra note 60, at 8-9.
62. E.g., Jones Report, supra note 45, at 41-42 (Exhibit No. 3), 77-78 (Exhibit No. 21);
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possessory right to the whole territory, but only to so much land as
the Indians actually used. 3 In fact, the reports found that the Spanish
and Mexican governments recognized Indian title only to the extent
that, once settled in communities, the Indians needed land to live on.
The former governments did not recognize any title to the soil in
the wild or wandering tribes .64 The reports recommended that the
United States honor these restricted Indian title rights:
The continued observance of this law, and the exercise of public authority
to protect the Indians in their rights under it, cannot . . . produce
any great inconvenience, while a proper regard for long recognized
rights and a proper sympathy for an unfortunate and unhappy class
would seem to forbid that it should be abrogated unless for a better.
The number of subjugated Indians is now too small, and the lands
they occupy too insignificant in amount for their protection, to ex-
tent of the law, to cause any considerable inconvenience. Besides,
there are causes at work by which even their present small number
is rapidly diminishing, so that any questions concerning them can
be but temporary . . . '65
Although California was in desperate need of a government, national
political considerations concerning the free-state/slave-state balance
delayed admission into statehood." Finally, as the result of the Great
Compromise,67 California was admitted into statehood on September
9, 1850.68 Unlike some other enabling acts, no mention was made
of protecting Indian rights in land reserved for the public domain.69
Halleck Report, supra note 45, at 150 (Appendix No. 14), 166 (Appendix No. 21); Letter,
H.W. Halleck to Col. J.D. Stevenson, 31st Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. 573, Doc. 17, 576-577 (1848).
See Sunol, I Cal. at 275-278; Byrne v. Alas 74 Cal. 628, 630-632 (1888).
63. See id.; ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 11.
They [the Spanish newcomers] brought with them to California the Laws of the In-
dies, controlling Spanish colonization and governing colonial ownership and use of
land. These laws were full of pious recognition of the rights of Indians to their posses-
sion, the right to as much land as they needed for their habitations, for tillage, and
for the pasturage of their flocks. So far as the California Indians were concerned,
this meant, practically, that when they were 'reduced,' that is, converted to Chris-
tianity and established within or around a mission area, they would have these
theoretical property rights. There was, of course, no recognition of Indian rights
to land not actually occupied or necessary for their use, nor was there any policy
of purchasing Indian titles. Obviously only Christianized California Indians could
share in any of the provisions of Spanish law.
Id.
64. See Jones Report, supra note 45, at 32-34; Byrne, 74 Cal. at 634, 637.
65. See Jones Report, supra note 45, at 33.
66. See Burns, supra note 57, at 472.
67. Id. at 473-75.
68. See California Act of Admission, Act of September 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 452.
69. For instance, by the Act of February 22, 1889, North Dakota, South Dakota, Mon-
tana and Washington were admitted as states. 25 Stat. 676. Among other provisions, the peo-
ple of those states agreed that:
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Immediately after California was admitted, Congress, fearful of
increased hostility between whites and Indians over the occupation
and ownership of land, sought to settle Indian title and private land
rights in the newly admitted State.7" On September 11, 1850, only
one day after they were sworn in as California Senators, 7 John
Fremont12 and William Gwin introduced bills providing for the
extinguishment of Indian territorial claims.73 Fremont's bill was
reported back with an amendment that authorized the President to
appoint agents for Indian tribes in California and appropriated money
for the President to deal with the tribes.74 In the debates that follow-
ed, the comments of the Senators reflected the general uncertainty
about the nature of Indian rights. Quoting from Spanish law, Fre-
mont echoed the earlier reports that found only certain Indians had
a right of occupation under Spain and Mexico:
The statements that I have given ... are sufficient to show that
the Spanish law clearly and absolutely secured to Indians fixed rights
of property in the lands they occupy beyond what is admitted by
the Government in its relation with its own domestic tribes, and that
some particular provisions will be necessary in order to divest them
of these rights. We hold these by strong hand alone. The Indians
dispute our right to be there, and they extend the privilege which
the law secured them of killing the cattle to that of killing the owner
whenever they find an occasion. Our occupation is in conflict with
theirs, and it is to render this occupation legal and equitable, and
to preserve the peace, that I have introduced this bill. It recommends
itself to the favorable consideration of the Senate by its obvious
necessity, and because it is right in itself, because it is politic, and
because it is conformable to the established custom of this
Government.7"
• . . they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries [of the new states] and to all lands lying within said limits owned
or held by any Indian tribes; and that until the title to thereto shall have been extinguish-
ed by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of
the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States; ....
Sec. 4, 25 Stat. at 667.
70. See supra note 57 and accompany text; HOOPES, supra note 46, at 12-15; Summa Corp.
v. California ex rel State Lands Com'n, 464 U.S. 888, 104 S. Ct. 1751, 1754 (1984); ANDERSON,
et al, TREATY MAKING AND TREATY REECTION, Tns FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1852
(Ritteizer, ed. Ballena Press 1978); Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1793, 1815 (1850).
71. See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1792 (1850).
72. Fremont was the successor to the grantee of an extremely valuable land grant, encom-
passing gold bearing regions. ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 143-44. This grant was later con-
firmed. Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1855).
73. See Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1793, 1802-1803 (1850).
74. Id. at 1816-1817; ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 8.
75. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., Ist Sess. 1817 (1850).
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Senator Gwin doubted that the Indians had any right in land what-
soever but urged that the matter be investigated.76
Eventually, after considerable discussion, Congress passed an
amended version of Fremont's bill." By the Act of September 30,
1850, Congress appropriated $25,000 to enable the President to appoint
three commissioners to study the "California situation and negotiate
treaties with the various Indian tribes in California.""8
Between March 19, 1851 and January 1852, the three commissioners
appointed by President Fillmore met with some 402 Indian chiefs and
headmen and negotiated a series of eighteen treaties.7" The tribes and
bands that negotiated with the United States constituted about one-
third to one-half the total number of the members of the tribes and
bands then living in California." The treaties were communicated to
the Senate by President Fillmore on June 1, 1852.81
At the time the treaties were negotiated, California Indians had
aboriginal title to nearly 75,000,000 acres of the state.2 Typically,
under the terms of these treaties, the Indians agreed to live under
the jurisdiction and authority of the United States Government in
peace and friendship with United States citizens and to make a blanket
cession, quitclaim and relinquishment to the United States of all their
rights in the land.83 As far as Indian title was concerned, a typical
treaty provided:
The said tribes hereby severally relinquish, and forever quit claim
to the government of the United States all the right, title, claim,
or interest, of whatsoever character, that they, or either of them
may have had, or now hold, in and to any lands in the limits of
the State of California, or the United States. 84
In return for their relinquishment of ownership, the Indians were
promised reservations of land, described in each treaty, totalling some
76. Id. at 1816.
77. E.g., id. at 1816-1817, 1828, 2008-2009, Appendix, pp. 1706-08; ANDERSON, supra note
70, at 12-13.
78. 9 Stat. 544, 558.
79. See KENNEY, supra note 45, at 10; 4 KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAW AND TREATIES
1081-1128 (1927). For a narrative treatment of the history of treaty-making with certain of
the California Indians see ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 13-26; HOOPES, supra note 46, at 27-81;
HEIZER, supra note 38, at 701-04.
80. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cls. at 591; HEIZER, supra note 38 at 703. These
treaties were not negotiated with all tribes in California. Id. In fact, 14 of the 139 signatory
groups were duplicates and 13 were unidentifiable. Id. Also the land ceded by such treaties
was not specified. Id.
81. See KAPPLER, supra note 79, at 1081, n.1.
82. See Indians of California v. United States, 98 Ct. Cls. at 588.
83. See id. See also KENNEY, supra note 45, at 10.
84. See KAPPLER, supra note 79, at 1082 (Treaty with the Si-Yan-Te).
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8,518,900 acres. 5 The Indians were further promised specific quan-
tities of goods, supplies, livestock and clothing.16
Any hopes for a peaceful resolution were doomed by the emigrants
who had been lured to California by the promise of Gold Rush wealth.
Throughout the state, particularly through newspapers and govern-
ment officials, the desire to remove or exterminate the Indians was
expressed and by January 1852, a strong, vocal anti-treaty attitude
developed throughout the state.87 Typical was the view of the Governor
of California who demanded removal of the Indians through federal
military intervention.8"
Eventually the rumors about the treaties led to meetings between
the United States treaty commissioners and the state legislature.8 9 Com-
mittees of both legislative houses were formed to investigate the
treaties.9" One State Senate special committee on the disposal of the
public lands prepared a lengthy memorial setting forth the understand-
ing of the committee regarding the problem and proposed that a system
of missions rather than reservations be established.9' The California
Senate committee specifically formed to inquire into the treaties recoxn-
mended against the policy pursued by the commissioners in entering
into treaties with the Indians in California.92 That Senate committee
submitted concurrent resolutions instructing the United States Senators
of California to oppose the confirmation of any and all treaties made
with the California Indians granting to those Indians the exclusive
right to occupy any of the public lands in California. The Senators
were instructed to use their best endeavors to induce the United States
to remove the Indians from the State.93 The Assembly Committee
made similar proposals. 9 Substantially identical resolutions opposing
ratification of the treaties were eventually adopted by both houses
85. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cis. at 598.
86. See Heizer, supra note 38, at 702; KENNEY, supra note 45, at 56-83. Some $1,405,799.48
worth of articles and chattels were promised by the treaties. Id. at 56, (Sched. 2). These articles
included coarse calico (at $3.15/yd), pants (at $2.25/pr) and flannel shirts (at $2.00 each).
Id. at 57, (Sched. 2A).
87. See Hoopas, supra note 46, at 82.
88. "Our best policy, and perhaps that of the General Government, would be to remove
them beyond the confines of the State." Calif. Sen. Journal, 3rd Sess., 21 (1852) (Message
of Governor McDougal); see also Hoopss, supra note 46, at 83.
89. Calif. Sen. Journal, 3rd Sess. 46-47, 67, 105 (1852); Calif. Assem. Journal 203, 396
(1852).
90. Calif. Sen. Journal, 3rd Sess. 46 (1852); Calif. Assem. Journal 202 (1852).
91. Report of the Special Committee on the Disposal of the Public Lands of the United
States in California, Calif. Sen. Journal, 3rd Sess. Appendix, 575, 588-590 (1852).
92. Calif. Sen. Journal 105-106 (1852).
93. Id.
94. Calif. Assem. Journal 202-205 (1852); HoopEs, supra note 46, at 89-90.
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of the California Legislature.95
The opposition of the state legislature was effectively communicated
to the California Senators, then holding the balance of power be-
tween the Whigs and the Democrats. 96 Although President Fillmore
and his Secretary of Interior supported ratification,97 the Senate
ultimately refused to ratify any of the treaties. 98 The reasons for Senate
rejection were best expressed by Senator Weller of California. Speak-
ing in support of an appropriation designed to preserve peace with
the California Indians after the failure of the Senate to ratify the
treaties, Senator Weller stated:
We who represent the state of California were compelled, from
a sense of duty, to vote for the rejection of the treaties, because
we knew it would be utterly impossible for the General Government
to retain these Indians in the undisturbed possession of these reser-
vations. Why, there were as many as six reservations made in a single
county . . . and that one of the best mining counties in the State.
They knew that these reservations included mineral lands, and that,
just so soon as it became profitable to dig upon the reservations
than elsewhere, the white man would go there, and that the whole
Army of the United States could not expel the intruders.
It was, therefore, under this stern necessity that we were compelled
to reject the treaties . . . after the Indians complied with them .
.. . It will be hard indeed to explain to these Indians how it came
that the formal treaties made with your accredited agents have been
violated. 99
95. Calif. Sen. Journal, 3rd Sess. 198 (1852); Calif. Assem. Journal 397 (1852).
RESOLVED, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives
requested, to use all proper means to prevent Congress confirming the Indian reser-
vations which have been made in this State, but respectfully to insist that the same
policy be adopted with regard to the Indian tribes in California which has been adopted
in other new States.
RESOLVED, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our Representatives
requested to urge upon Congress the great evils that would inevitably result to the
people of California, the National Government, and the Indian tribes by the confir-
mation of those reservations.
RESOLVED, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives
requested, to urge upon the proper authorities, at Washington the importance of
instituting a rigid inquiry into the official conduct of the several Indian Agents, for
California, as, in the opinion of the legislature, highhanded and unprecedented frauds
have been perpetrated by them, against the General Government and the citizens
of California.
RESOLVED, That the Governor be, and he is hereby, requested to transmit a
copy of each of the foregoing resolutions to the President of the United States and
to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress.
Calif. Assem. Journal 205 (1852).
96. See Goodrich, The Legal Status of the California Indians, 14 CALIF. L. Rav. 6, 46
(1914).
97. See KAPPLER, supra note 79, at 1081, n.1; HooPEs, supra note 46, at 100-101.
98. See KAPPLER, supra note 79, at 1081, n.1; 1928 Hearings, supra note 38, at 86.
99. Cong. Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2173 (1852).
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After the Senate refused to ratify any of the eighteen treaties, the
treaties were classified as secret.' 0
Pending the advice and consent of the Senate on the treaties, federal
officials induced the tribes to remove from their original habitats to
the "reservations" specified in the treaties.' 0 ' With the rejection of
the treaties, the California Indians became homeless. Ultimately the
California Indians were reduced through starvation, disease and murder
to a population of only about 17,000.02 One commentator described
the effect of the failure to ratify the treaties:
... The Indian population was reduced .... Much of this wantonly
destroyed humanity and a great deal more of native culture would
have survived if the California Indians had been protected on the
reserves stipulated in the 18 treaties. But with the failure of the U.S.
Senate to ratify the very treaties they had authorized, the California
Indians . . . were helpless [citations omitted]. In the history of
California Indians no other single event (that is "non-event") had
a more rapid destructive effect on their population and culture than
the about-face the Senate made between authorizing president
Fillmore ...to make treaties ahd its failure ...to ratify those
treaties. 3
An understandable desire to place land title in California on a solid
foundation arose during the period in which the treaties were
negotiated.0 4 As a result, on March 3, 1851, Congress enacted "An
Act to Ascertain and Settle the Land Claims in the State of
California."'' 0 5 Under the terms of the Land Claims Act, "each and
every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or
title derived by the Mexican government" was required to present
a claim' 6 to a three-person Board of Land Commissioners ("Land
Commissioners") appointed with the approval of the Senate.' 7 The
Land Commissioners were to decide on the validity of the claims
presented,0 8 and United States would issue patents to those whose
100. See 1928 Hearings, supra note 38, at 86. For a narrative treatment of the rejection
of the treaties, see HoopEs, supra note 46, at 97-121; Heizer, supra note 38, at 701-704.
101. See GOODRICH, supra note 96, at 96; Cong Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2172 (1852)
(remarks of Sen. Weller); COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 201 (G.P.O. 1958) (reprinted Oceana
Publications 1966) (hereinafter 1958 COHEN).
102. See KENNY, supra note 45, at 19. See also Heizer, supra note 40, at 704; HORNIBECK,
supra note 44, at 35.
103. Heizer, supra note 40, at 704.
104. E.g., Fremont, 50 U.S. at 553-554; Summa, 104 S. Ct. at 1756.
105. Act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 631. (Hereinafter referred to as the Land Claims Act).
106. Id. at section 8, 9 Stat. at 632.
107. Id. at section 1, 9 Stat. at 631.
108. Id. at section 8, 9 Stat. at 632.
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valid title was confirmed.'0 9 All lands, the claim to which was invalid
or not presented within two years of the date of the Land Claims
Act, would pass into the public domain." '
Further, under section 16 of the Land Claims Act, the Land Com-
missioners were ordered to "ascertain and report to the Secretary of
the Interior the tenure by which the mission lands are held, and those
held by civilized Indians, and those who are engaged in agriculture
or labor of any kind, and also those which are occupied and cultivated
by Pueblo or Ranchero Indians.""' This duty was presumably
performed. " 
2
On March 3, 1853, "An Act to Provide for the Survey of the Public
Lands in California, the Granting of Pre-Emption Rights Therein, and
for Other Purposes" was adopted. ' 3 Not coincidentally, the Act of
March 3, 1853 became effective on the same date on which the lands,
title to which was not applied for pursuant to the Land Claims Act,
passed into the public domain by virtue of the two-year statute of
limitation contained in the Land Claims Act.
The Act of March 3, 1853 provided that public lands in California,
other than those claimed by recipients of Spanish or Mexican land
grants, granted to the State for public schools or reserved as mineral
lands, were subject to pre-emption under the Pre-emption act of 1841.' ,
However, the Act of March 3, 1853 was not construed to authorize
settlement of ". . . tracts of land in the occupation or possession
of any Indian tribe, or grant any pre-emption right to the same. '"I
The effect of these two acts, particularly the Land Claims Act, on
then-existing aboriginal title historically has been the subject of some
109. Id. at section 13, 9 Stat. at 633. These patents were deeds of the United States that
operated as a quitclaim of any claim of interest of the United States. Beard v. Federy, 70
U.S. (3 Wall) 478, 491 (1865). Such patents were a record of the action of the United States
on the claimant's title as such title existed when the United States acquired California. Id.
110. Id.; Rodrigues v. United States, 68 U.S. 582, 588 (1863); Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S.
761, 763-64 (1875); Botiller, 130 U.S. at 249.
111. Land Claims Act, supra note 105, at sec. 16, 9 Stat. at 634. Instructions given to
the Land Commissioners required separate and full reports. Report of the Secretary of Interior
(1852) 32nd Cong., Ist Sess., Doc. No. 26, Ser. 614, p. 6.
112. See Barker, 181 U.S. at 493; Thompson, 8 Ind. CIs. Comm. at 36-38. Although Thomp-
son, referred to such a report, the authors have been unable to find any such report. Cf.
Report of California Land Commissioner, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Ex. Doc. 1, Ser. 746,
3 (1854).
113. Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 244 (hereinafter Act of March 3, 1853).
114. Id. at sec. 6, 10 Stat. at 246. Pre-emption defines the preferential right of purchase
given to actual settlers. RoBINsoN, supra note 60, at 167. A brief history of the pre-emption
law and its operation in California is found in ROBINSON, Id.
115. Act of March 3, 1853, supra note 113, sec. 6, 10 Stat. at 246. This provision also
recognizes that on March 3, 1853, Congress authorized the President to establish five military
reservations in California for Indian purposes. See Act of March 3, 1853, Stat. 238.
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controversy.'6 Even today, litigation concerning the claimed existence
of unextinguished aboriginal title is vigorously pursued on behalf of
Indian claimants." 7 Not surprisingly, the California Indians claim to
have been unaware of the need to present their claims before the Land
Commissioners, and, therefore, assert that no such claims need to
have been or were made. 1
After 1852, the United States made no further effort either to
negotiate new treaties, or renegotiate the rejected treaties with the
California Indians." 9 The United States dealt with the California
Indians either through special legislation passed by Congress, or
through Executive Orders of the President.' 21
Ultimately, the United States statutorily confirmed the unstated
policy of removal of the California Indians that had begun with the
treaty negotiations. One manifestation of this new policy was the crea-
tion of Indian reservations in California.' 2 ' For example, Congress
gave the President discretion to set apart, ". . . not exceeding four
tracts of land, within the limits of said State, to be retained by the
United States for the purposes of Indian Reservations, which shall
be of suitable extent for the accommodations of the Indians of said
State, and shall be located as remote from white settlements as may
be found practicable . .. . The President could also alter and
enlarge reservations from time to time in light of experience. 23
Accordingly, reservations were established and periodically were altered
116. See Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1148; Harvey v. Barker, 126 Cal. 262, 267-68 (1899), aff'd,
Barker, 181 U.S. 481.
117. E.g., U.S. exrelChuniev. Ringrose, et. al., U.S.D.C., C.D. Cal. No. 84-4144 DWW
(JRX), app. pdg. (9th Cir. 1985) No. 85-5508. In that case, representatives of the Island Chumash
Indians claim aboriginal ownership of certain of the Channel Islands and surrounding tide and
submerged lands lying off the Santa Barbara County coast. These Channel Islands were the
subject of confirmed Mexican land grants. United States v. Castillero, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 464,
469 (1859); Manuel Carrillo de Jones v. United States, (S.D.Cal. 1855) No. 56.
118. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cis. at 592; Thompson, 8 Ind. CIs. Comm. at 8,
23-29; ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 15-16; GOODRICH, supra note 96, at 98-99.
119. See ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 15-20; Stewart, Litigation and Its Effects in 8 HAND-
BOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, 701 (R. Heizer, ed., Smithsonian 1978).
120. Id., KENNEY, supra note 45, at 22-23. These acts and executive orders are collected
in KAPPLER, supra note 79, at 815-32. For a narrative treatment of this period, see CASTILLO,
supra note 38, at 110-127.
121. See KAPP ER, supra note 79, at 815-23; Act of March 3, 1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238;
Act of March 3, 1855, 10 Stat. 698, 699; Act of July 5, 1862, 12 Stat. 512, 530. See Mattz
v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 487 (1973). "[The reservations] were founded on the principle, not
of attempting to do something for the native, but of getting them out of the white man's
way as cheaply and hurriedly as possible." KROEBER, supra note 40, at 890.
122. Act of April 8, 1864, 13 Stat. 39, 40, sec. 2.
123. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 257 (1912), on reh'g, Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 708 (1913); Mattz, 412 U.S. at 493-94.
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and enlarged.'24 Since 1864, 117 reservations have been set aside by
executive order, comprising a total of about 632,000 acres. 25 These
lands held for the Indians ". . . were largely-not entirely-the desert,
mountain, grazing lands, isolated, ill-adopted to agriculture, largely
without water, the lifeblood of agriculture in California- waste lands,
those left after the host of settlers had filed on and became possessed
of the water and practically all the best lands of the State."'
2 6
On January 18, 1905, due in large part to public outcry, 27 the wall
of secrecy that surrounded the eighteen unratified treaties was removed
by order of the Senate.'28 The publication of the treaties sparked
interest in the plight of the Indians of California, and efforts were
made to legislate a special jurisdictional act that would enable the
Indians to bring claims in recompense of the unfulfilled treaties.
29
The first such proposal, made in 1920,130 was unsuccessful, as were
the bills immediately following.'
Finally, in 1927, the California legislature passed an act authoriz-
ing the California Attorney General to bring suit against the United
States in the Court of Claims on behalf of the California Indians.' 32
The law was to take effect when Congress passed legislation permit-
ting suit against the United States.' 33
In 1928, Congress responded by passing the California Indians'
124. E.g., Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 258.
125. See Stewart, supra note 119, at 705-06. See also id. at 709-10 (containing a list of
such reservations).
126. KENNEY, supra note 45, at 23. For further history of the California Indians, see Heizer,
supra note 40, at 704: Goodrich, supra note 96, 14 at 96-97, n.54.
The principal cause of the appallingly great and rapid decrease in the Indians of
California . . . is the gradual but progressive and relentless confiscation of their
lands and homes, in consequence of which they are forced to seek refuge in remote
and barren localities, often far from water, usually with an impoverished supply of
food, and not infrequently in places where the winter climate is too severe for their
enfeebled constitutions.
Id. However, there are exceptions to this characterization. For example, the Klamath River
Indian reservation was established along side the Klamath River and is rich with timber and
other natural resources. See Matt v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 487 (1973); Short v. United States,
486 F.2d 561, 562 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
127. See Castillo, Twentieth Century Secular Movements in 8 HAnDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANs 713, 715 (R. Heizer, ed. Smithsonian 1978); Stewart, supra note 119, at 705-06; KENNEY,
supra note 45, at 25-27.
128. See Hearings, Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, House of Rep. 66th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
6, 55 (1920).
129. A list of hearings and bills which evidence such efforts is found in the 1928 Hearings,
supra note 38, at 19.
130. H.R. 12788, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., - Cong. Rel. __ (1920).
131. See Dyer, Ruth C., The Indians' Land Title In California: A Case in Federal Equity,
1851-1942, 34-38 (Thesis U.C. 1944) (reprinted R & E Research Associates 1975).
132. Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 1092.
133. Id.
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Jurisdictional Act of 1928.3 ' There are several pertinent features of
this distinctive legislation. First, the "Indians of California" were
defined as "all Indians who were residing in the State of California
as of June 1, 1852, and their descendants now living in said state.""
Second, the Court of Claims was given jurisdiction over "[a]ll claims
of whatsoever nature .. . [against the United States] by reason of
lands taken from [the Indians of California] ...by the United States
without compensation, or for the failure or refusal of the United States
to compensate them for their interest in lands in said State which
the United States appropriated to its own purposes without the con-
sent of said Indians ...136 Such claims could be submitted by peti-
tion to the Court of Claims by the California Attorney General.'
These claims would be allowed despite the failure to submit them
to the Land Commissioners by virtue of the Land Claims Act.' 38 The
Jurisdictional Act of 1928 further declared that:
The loss to the said Indians on account of their failure to secure
the lands and compensation provided for in the eighteen unratified
treaties is sufficient ground for equitable relief. '39
Any decree for compensation was limited to the compensation pro-
mised in the unratified treaties, and compensation for land was limited
to only $1.25 an acre. 40 Moreover, any payments or expenditures
made by the United States on behalf of any California Indians prior
to the date of the award would be set off against the final amount
awarded.'' The judgment was not to be distributed on a per capita
basis, but placed in the Treasury of the United States for the benefit
of the Indians.'1 2 The State of California was to be reimbursed for
costs, but not for the services of the California Attorney General. 43
Besides the limitation on compensation for lands and the allowance
of set-offs, the most glaring deficiency of the 1928 Jurisdictional Act
was the fact compensation for all Indians of California was to be
134. Act of May 18, 1928, 45 Stat. 602 (hereinafter 1928 Jurisdictional Act) codified 25
U.S.C. §651, et. seq. (All further citations to the 1928 Jurisdictional Act will be to the United
States Code).
135. 25 U.S.C. §651.
136. 25 U.S.C. §652.
137. 25 U.S.C. §654.
138. 25 U.S.C. §653.
139. 25 U.S.C. §652.
140. 25 U.S.C. §653.
141. Id.
142. Subsequent legislation provided for such a per capita distribution. See 25 U.S.C. §658.
143. 25 U.S.C. §655; KENNEY, supra note 45, at 27.
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granted on the basis of the treaties made with only one-third to one-
half of California Indians. In other words, the Indian tribes who were
not parties to the unratified treaties were not to be compensated for
lands from which they were removed, but were left to share in the
award based on the failure of the United States to honor the promise
to set aside lands for the other one-third to one-half of California
Indian tribes. Moreover, the United States would be allowed to set-
off all appropriations made on behalf of any California Indians.
On August 14, 1929, the Attorney General of California filed the
original petition with the Court of Claims.'" When the report of poten-
tial offsets was filed in 1934,1' s the report showed that the offsets
would largely vitiate any compensation for the lands taken.'" 6 As a
result, numerous attempts were made to amend the limitations on
the final recovery contained in the original Act, including, inter alia,
bills to broaden the base of recovery by including non-treaty Indians,
and bills to increase the price to be paid for lands from $1.25 to
$5.70 per acre.' 7
The facts of the case were finally presented to the Court of Claims
on May 7, 1941, by Attorney General Earl Warren. The decision of
the Court of Claims was delayed pending last-ditch efforts to broaden
the base of recovery.' s
Finally, on October 25, 1942, the Court of Claims, emphasizing
the equitable nature of the claim based on the unfulfilled promise
of the United States to ratify the treaties,'4 9 established the liability
of the United States for the broken promises. Significantly, however,
the court denied recovery for interest as "the case does not involve
payment for land of which the Indians had a cession, or use and
occupancy . . . there has been no taking which under the Constitu-
tion would require just compensation to be paid and therefore would
involve interest."' 0 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
144. See KENNEY, supra note 45, at 30.
145. It required almost three years to compile a report on the potential offsets. See id. at 31.
146. Id. at p. 32.
147. Id. at p. 47; S. 1793, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. 5243, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937); S. 1651, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. 1779, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 3765,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. 710, 112, 1366, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 3622, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). KENNEY, supra note 45, at 36-38 (provides a brief description of the
attempts to modify or supplant the 1928 Jurisdictional Act).
148. See KENNEY, supra note 45, at 32-33; Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United
States, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22121 (1941) (Statement of California Deputy Attorney General H.H. Linney).
149. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. CI. at 586.
150. Id. at 600.
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on the question of interest.' 5'
Fearful that a trial on the issue of damages would produce no
recovery because of the set-off provision, the California Attorney
General negotiated a settlement of $5,024,842.34, which was approved
by the Court of Claims.'12 Congress appropriated the sum in pay-
ment of the judgment.' 3
As was the case with Indians of California, tribes seeking to redress
grievances against the United States had long been forced to lobby
for the passage of specific jurisdictional acts that provided the requisite
consent of the sovereign to suit. The process was enormously time-
consuming, often requiring many years to have a single jurisdictional
act passed. Once suit was commenced, the Court of Claims was often
prevented from giving adequate relief if the narrowly defined jurisdic-
tion did not extend to all aspects of the tribe's claim.'54 Indeed, when
the Attorney General of California recommended accepting the set-
tlement, he suggested that the Indians of California seek further com-
pensation ". . . for the injustice practiced upon them by the rejec-
tion of the treaties negotiated in 1851-52, and to satisfy their legal,
moral and equitable claims against the United States of America."'"
Due to the inadequacies of the jurisdictional act approach to resolv-
ing Indian claims,' 6 Congress in 1946 established the Indian Claims
Commission (hereinafter "Claims Commission").5 7 In brief, the Claims
Commission was empowered to hear a broad range of claims" 8 by
Indians against the United States, including claims for taking of
aboriginal title to lands.'" 9 As a consequence of a long, drawn-out
and complicated series of proceedings before the Claims Commission,
the Indians of California were finally compensated for claims based
on loss of aboriginal title.
151. See Indians of California v. United States, 319 U.S. 764 (1944).
152. Indians of California v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 837 (1944). For a discussion of
the settlement, see KENNEY, supra note 45, .at 35-49.
153. See 59 Stat. 77, 94. A distribution of this fund has been made. 25 U.S.C. §§658, 661.
154. United States Indian Claims Commission, Annual Reports, 1968-74, Appendix 7, p.
1; see KENNEY, supra note 45, at 49.
155. See KENNEY, supra note 45, at 49.
156. Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 906, 914 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also 25 U.S.C. §70 el. seq.
158. See 25 U.S.C. §70a; United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. at 55 (Black, J., concurr-
ing); Thompson v. United States, 1 Ind. Cls. Comm. 366, 378 (1950) ("Jurisdiction so broad
that no tribe could later come back and say it had a claim which the commission was not
authorized to consider."); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 160-162 (1982 ed.).
159. See Otoe Missouri Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
cert. den., 350 U.S. 848 (1955); Fort Berthold Revervation, 390 F.2d at 696. For a history
of the work of the Indian Claims Commission, see United States Indian Claims Commission,
Annual Reports 1968-74, Appendix 7. For a brief explanation of the workings of the Indian
Claims Commission Act, see COHEN, supra note 58, at 356-359.
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In a suit docketed Thompson v. United States, "I a group of Indians
petitioned for the exclusive right to present, on behalf of all the "In-
dians of California," all claims to land in California based on
aboriginal title.' 6' The "Indians of California" were defined by the
petitioners to include the same class of Indians that was described
and defined in the 1928 Jurisdictional Act,'62 -all Indians living in
the State of California as of June 1, 1852, and their living
descendants.' 63 Before the Claims Commission, the United States suc-
cessfully challenged the characterization of the "Indians of California,"
claiming that the "Indians of California," as defined, were not an
"identifiable" group of Indians within the meaning of the Claims
Commission Act. 64 The Court of Claims, relying on the legislative
history of the Indian Claims Commission Act and on the model of
the 1928 Jurisdictional Act, reversed the finding of the Claims Com-
mission and found that the "Indians of California" were an iden-
tifiable group for purposes of presenting a claim before the Claims
Commission. 165
On remand, the Claims Commission denied the "Indians of
California" the exclusive right to represent all Indians of the State,
pointing to language in the Claims Commission Act' 66 which allowed
a tribal organization, where one existed, to be the exclusive
representative. 67 Individual tribal organizations were therefore allowed
to and did file claims distinct from the claim of the "Indians of
California."' 61 In order to facilitate the manageability of the claims
before the Claims Commission, on motion of the Indian groups (in-
cluding the "Indians of California"), the Claims Commission divid-
160. Thompson v. United States (Docket No. 31) was consolidated with a similar petition,
Risling v. United States (Docket No. 37). Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 2; Clyde F. Thompson,
et. al. (1952) 122 Ct. Cl. 348, cert. den., sub. nom., United States v. Thompson, 344 U.S.
856 (1952). The liability of the United States for the extinguishment of aboriginal title was
established in Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 1. See Thompson v. United States, 13 Ind.
Cis. Comm. 369 (1964) (the settlement of the damage aspect of the claim was approved).
161. See Thompson, 1 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 367, 370; Clyde F. Thompson, 122 Ct. Cl. at 350.
162. See 25 U.S.C. §651.
163. See Thompson, 1 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 367.
164. Id., at 358; Clyde F. Thompson, 122 Ct. Cl. at 350. See 25 U.S.C. §70(i).
165. See Clyde F. Thompson, 122 Ct. Cl. at 357, 361.
166. See Thompson v. United States, 6 Ind. Cls. Comm. 86, 90-91 (1958).
167. See 25 U.S.C. §70(i).
168. Id. The tribal organizations which maintained separate actions were the Northern Paiute
Nation (docket 87), the Southern Paiute Nation (Docket 88), the Mohave Tribe (Dockets 283
and 295), the Chemehuevi Tribe (docket 355), the Quechan Tribe (docket 319), the Washoe,
Yashookin, Klamath and Modoe Tribes (Docket 100), the Mission Band of Indians (Docket
80) and the Pit River Tribe (Docket 347). The lands of the Klamath and Modoc Tribes were
found to have been taken pursuant to a ratified treaty and award was made on the basis of
inadequate compensation. See Thompson, 13 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 370.
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ed California into Area A and Area B. "9 Area A comprised the lands
in California that were subject to aboriginal claims of certain designated
individual tribal organizations; 7 ' the remaining lands in California,
known as Area B, were subject to the aboriginal claims brought before
the Claims Commission on behalf of the "Indians of California" and
generally comprised California west of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.' 7'
In 1964, representatives of the Indians of California, as well as
the Pit River and Mission Indians, agreed to a tentative settlement
of their claims.'7 The land involved in the settlement comprised
57,000,000 acres, after deduction of land grants and reservations paid
for as the result of the 1944 settlement; 17  29 million dollars was to
be paid in satisfaction of this claim. 74 The settlement stipulation also
provided:
The stipulation and entry of final judgment shall finally dispose
of all claims or demands which any of the petitioners and claimants
represented in any of said dockets ... have asserted or could have
asserted against defendant in any of said cases either before or after
any consolidation, and petitioners (and all claimants represented
thereby), and each of them, shall be barred from asserting all such
claims or demands in any future action.'7-
169. See Thompson v. United States, 6 Ind. Cls. Comm. 666, 673 (1958).
170. Id.; Thompson, 13 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 373, n.2.
171. See Thompson, 6 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 673; Thompson, 13 Ind. CIs. Comm. at 381.
172. See Thompson, Ind. Cls. Comm. at 507-510. For a detailed history of the procedural
aspects of the cases that led to the settlement, see id. at 369-384.
173. See id. at 382. The Indians of California contended that Spanish and Mexican land
grants were made subject to the Indians' right of occupancy, and that therefore, the rights
were preserved under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. However, the Commission held:
It is plain that by the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, there passed
to the United States full title to all the lands of the Republic of Mexico lying nor-
therly of the boundary line between the United States and Mexico fixed by Article
V of said treaty. And . . . the Mexican Republic could not and did not cede to
the United States lands which either it or the Spanish Crown had granted prior to
May 13, 1846 (Art. 2d of the Protocol), so had the Mexican Republic recognized
Indian right of occupancy in Spanish and Mexican grants it would have been necessary
to require the United States to recognize and respect such Indians rights in tile granted
lands as it required our Government to respect and acknowledge the grantees' rights
and titles in the granted lands. Since no such provision was made in the treaty, the
Indians had no rights of occupancy in the granted lands that we are required to
consider as obligations of the United States.
Thompson, 8 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 20. The Area B lands were therefore reduced by the acreage
of the confirmed Spanish and Mexican grants and confirmed grants to California Missions
located in Area B. See id. at 5. On the other hand, the award made by the Court of Claims
pursuant to the 1928 Jurisdictional Act could not be considered as compensation for aboriginal
lands taken because that judgment was made on the basis of the value of only the lands includ-
ed in the 18 unratified treaties and not the state at large. Id. at 30. However, the Commission
suggested that Congress might reduce its appropriation for the present award by the amount
paid under the 1928 Act. Id. at 30-31.
174. See Thompson, 13 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 386.
175. Id.
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Hearings were held throughout the State of California on the pro-
posed settlements. Members of the "Indians of California" and the
other specified tribes were invited to express their views, ask ques-
tions of the attorneys representing them, and then cast their votes
in favor or against the settlement. 76 At the conclusion of these pro-
ceedings, members of the Indians of California and the Pit River and
Mission Indians voted to approve the settlement. 77 After an investiga-
tion of the various charges alleging improprieties about the manner
in which the settlement was presented to the Indian groups and the
manner in which votes were cast, the Claims Commission approved
the settlement. 78 Congress appropriated and authorized the distribu-
tion of funds on a per capita basis to all members of the "Indians
of California" except to members of those organizations who were
represented exclusively by their tribal organizations.' 79 The remaining
tribal organizations who brought suit, but were not included in the
settlement, also have been awarded judgments by the Claims
Commission. 180
The history of federal actions in California demonstrates that the
United States would not adhere to a policy that would protect Indian
title. Indeed, since the inception of the United States' sovereignty over
the territory of California, the United States focused attention on secur-
ing a solid basis of land title for new settlers at the expense of Cali-
fornia Indians. Although the United States has taken actions to com-
pensate the Indians of California for the loss of their aboriginal lands,
the central question is whether, in light of the actions of the federal
government, aboriginal title still exists in California and burdens land
titles. To answer that question, the methods of extinguishing aboriginal
title must be understood.
176. See id. at 393-434.
177. Id. at 434. With 58.8% of the eligible Indians voting, 11,427 favored the settlement,
and 3,310 opposed it. Id.
178. Id. at 543. In Andrade v. United States, 485 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1973), the Pit River
Indians sought to reopen the judgment, realleging these purported improprieties, but they were
prohibited from doing so.
179. Pub. L. 88-635, Ch. XI, 78 Stat. 1023, 1033 (1964); 25 U.S.C. §660. There has been
litigation concerning the distribution of this fund. See Angle v. United States, 709 F.2d 570
(9th Cir. 1983).
180. See Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 13 Ind. Cls. Comm. 41 (1964);
Chemeheuvi Tribe v. United States, 14 Ind. Cls. Comm. 673 (1965); Quechan Tribe v. United
States, 15 Ind. Cls. Comm. 489 (1965); Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 16 Ind. Cls.
Comm. 289 (1965); Mohave Tribe v. United States, 26 Ind. Cls. Comm. 582 (1971). The claims
of the Mission Band of Indians (Docket 80) and the Pit River Indians (Docket 347) were con-
solidated in the Indians of California docket (Docket 31). Thompson, 13 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 369.
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METHODS OF EXTINGUISHMENT
Aboriginal title may be extinguished by a great variety of sovereign
actions. The classic statement is that extinguishment may be
accomplished "by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise
of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or other-
wise . . ,.8 The leading case concerning extinguishment is United
States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co.' 2
In Santa Fe, the United States, as guardian of the Walapai tribe,
sued to enjoin the railroad from interfering with the tribe's occupancy
of lands in Arizona both inside and outside the reservation." 3 The
railroad claimed full title to lands by virtue of a United States' grant
to the predecessor of the railroad. ' However, the act on which the
title of the railroad was based required that "the United States shall
extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and
the welfare of the Indians, and only by their voluntary cession, the
Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of this act .... I
Thus, unless the United States had previously extinguished aboriginal
title, the railroad would own the land subject to the Indian right of
occupancy.8 6 Although the Court of Appeal had held that the United
States had never recognized Indian title in the Mexican Cession,'
the Supreme Court found that, as a matter of policy, the United States
did recognize aboriginal possession.'88 After reviewing various federal
transactions that related to the land in question,' 89 the Court found
that the acceptance of a reservation created by request of the Walapais
.. . amounted to a relinquishment of any tribal claims to lands
which they might have had outside that reservation and that relin-
quishment was tantamount to an extinguishment by 'voluntary ces-
sion' within the meaning of [the Act donating title to the predecessor
of the railroad]."'' 9
In deciding what acts amounted to an extinguishment of Indian
title, the court set forth certain rules. "The power of Congress [to
181. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347; Lipan Apache Tribe, 180 Ct. Cl. at 492. See Johnson
v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 587 (extinguishment can be accomplished by purchase or conquest).
182. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 339.
183. Id. at 343-44.
184. Id. at 343.
185. Id. at 344.
186. Id. at 344-45.
187. Id. at 345.
188. Id. at 345-46. See infra notes 352-365 and accompanying text.
189. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347-57.
190. Id. at 357-58 (emphasis added).
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extinguish Indian title] is supreme. The manner, method and time
of such extinguishment raises political, not justiciable, issues . ." . '9'
The right of the United States to extinguish Indian title has never
been doubted; the justness of the right is not open to inquiry in the
courts.1 92 However, ". . . an extinguishment cannot be lightly implied
in view of the avowed solicitude of the Federal government for the
welfare of its Indian wards."' 93
Thus, according to Santa Fe, the prerequisite for an effective
extinguishment is that the power be exercised only by the United States.
While language in the Santa Fe decision suggests that Congress, as
opposed to other governmental branches - possesses the exclusive
right to extinguish, most opinions dealing with this subject use "federal
government" fungibly with "Congress". Certainly, in practice, actions
of the executive branch have served to extinguish aboriginal title.' 9
Irrespective of whether both branches of the federal government
or Congress alone have the power to extinguish, the United States
alone has the ability to do so. This is the unmistakable teaching of
the eastern Indian land claims litigation. As emphatically, although
narrowly, decided in the Oneida Indian cases, only the United States
can terminate or permit the termination of aboriginal title. '9S The con-
ceptual basis of this sole power was analyzed in an Indian Claims
Commission case, Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States. 96 In Lipan,
the United States sought to avoid liability for the extinguishment of
Indian title lands in Texas. The government, in defense, pointed out
191. Id. at 347; Lac Courte Oreilles Band, Etc. v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 351 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. den., sub. nom, Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreilles Band Of Lake Superior Chippewa In-
dians, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
192. See Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347.
193. Id. at 354. Some courts appear to set a more stringent standard, at least rhetorically.
Compare Lipan Apache Tribe, 180 Ct. Cl. at 492, (acts of extinguishment must be "plain
and unambiguous") and Bennett County, South Dakota v. United States, 394 F.2d 8, 9 (8th
Cir. 1968) (intent to extinguish by grant or legislation must be clearly and unequivocally stated)
with Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 946 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (will not lightly imply extinguishment). Indeed, the standard may differ depending
on whether the Courts are considering the extinguishment of aboriginal title or of treaty-recognized
title. Lac Courte Oreilles, 700 F.2d at 351-352. The United States can extinguish aboriginal
title ". .. at any time and by any means ... " abrogation of treaty-recognized title requires
"... an explicit statement by Congress or at least, it must be clear from the circumstances
and legislative history surrounding a Congressional act." [Citation omitted]. Id. Santa Fe sup-
ports this distinction as the Indians off-reservation aboriginal rights were extinguished by im-
plication in that case. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 358; Lac Courte Oreilles, 700 F.2d at 352-53.
Thus, the cases requiring a "plain and unambiguous" act of extinguishment must be read with
this distinction between aboriginal title and treaty-recognized title clearly in mind.
194. See, e.g., Plamandon ex rel. Cowlitz Tribe of Indians v. United States, 467 F.2d 935,
937 (1972); United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1391-92.
195. See Oneida Indian Nation, 414 U.S. at 667; County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1251.
196. Lipan Apache Tribe, 180 Ct. Cl. 487.
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that Texas, unlike most states, had title to public lands within the
borders of the state, and that the Texas Legislature, soon after
statehood, had passed a resolution extinguishing aboriginal title. The
Court of Claims rejected this contention. The court held that the power
of the United States to extinguish stems not from ownership of lands,
but from the general constitutional grant of power to deal with In-
dians. The court reiterated the principle that only the federal govern-
ment, even though not feeholder in the lands, had the power to
abrogate aboriginal title through unilateral action. 97
There is no magic formula, however, for extinguishing aboriginal
title. For example, Indian title may be extinguished through acquisi-
tion, by eminent domain, by wrongful appropriation against an
unwilling party, by a coerced, unfair or invalid agreement, or by
purchase for an unconscionably low consideration.' Indeed, despite
their reference to the need for "unequivical" federal conduct courts,
in practice, have not required as a precondition to a finding of
extinguishment any single, discrete, plain and unambiguous act ter-
minating the right of occupancy. Courts recognize that an examina-
tion of each individual governmental action in isolation will not pro-
vide an answer to whether or not there was an intent by the United
States to extinguish aboriginal title. Rather, these courts have deter-
mined the extinguishment of Indian title based on an accumulation
of factors, often without being able to point specifically to any par-
ticular event or act.'9 9 This was evident in many cases for compensa-
tion filed with the Claims Commission, in which the Commission
averaged possible dates of the "taking" of aboriginal title for the
purposes of evaluating and determining the price of the lands,2"' due
to the extreme difficulty in pointing to a single, definitive date of
extinguishment. 20 ' Congress does not often make explicit the intent
to extinguish Indian title as in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act.20 2 Actual extinguishment more typically resembles the process
197. Id. at 497.
198. See Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota v. United States,
428 F.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
199. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 341 U.S. at 357-358; Geminill, 535 F.2d at 1149; Plamondon, 467
F.2d at 936. Cf. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 933.
200. The date and fact of extinguishment is a necessary and critical finding in these cases
since compensation for loss of lands awarded in Claims Commission cases is measured by the
fair market value from the date the United States actually takes over possession or exerts domi-
nion. Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians, 428 F.2d at 1277.
201. See, e.g., Pueblo of San 11defonso, 513 F.2d at 1391-92; United States v. Northern
Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d 954, 957 (Ct. CI. 1974).
202. See 43 U.S.C. §1601 et. seq; Edwardson v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1376 (D.D.C.
1973).
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described by the Court of Claims in one such case:
The Commission could not have supposed that any of the facts
it recited respecting the end of 1862 constituted takings in and of
themselves .... The explanation seems and is obvious: they were
laying down an average, composite, or jury verdict taking date
.... Such a legal shortcut is often necessary in Indian claims litiga-
tion, if it is ever to be concluded, and has the sanction of the
Supreme Court. Creek Nation v. United States, 302 U.S.
620 ... (1938). [In this case] the record was void of any single clear-
cut extinguishment. The miners staked their claims, the miners mined,
the Indians attacked, the United States troops came to the rescue
of the miners, the troops defeated the Indians, the United States
agents hopefully established reservations they wished the Indians to
move onto, but did not compel them to, some Indians nevertheless
did, the Congress retroactively validated the miners' claims, vis-a-
vis one another, and vis-a-vis the United States, the President at long
last established the reservations. As to non-mineral portions of the
tract, there was even less. It was arguable, and defendant argued,
that the Indian title had never been extinguished. Somehow by the
concatenation of events, at some unknown date or dates, it was.
The Commission closed its eyes and picked a date; the parties,
relieved, went on to prove things that could be proved."0 3
What must be understood is that the United States rarely performs
a definitive act of extinguishment. Nevertheless, the policy of the
United States has always been to extinguish aboriginal title,20 ' and
the courts, by reviewing the cumulative effect of the government's
actions, have found extinguishment.
The fact that extinguishment can be implied from a series of events
and circumstances, rather than requiring a single, discrete "plain and
unambiguous" act, has important consequences. As the court suggests,
one need only point to the "concatenation of events," take note that
Indians have been removed from their aboriginal lands, and find that
their title has been extinguished.2 5 This "cumulative impact" analysis
greatly enhances the probability that an extinguishment will be found.
This probability is increased by the fact that Congress can extinguish
Indian title in any manner Congress chooses, unimpeded by constitu-
tional restrictions. 20 6 With that understanding, various specific methods
of extinguishment that have been judicially approved will be examined.
203. Northern Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d at 957.
204. See Choctaw Nation, supra, 397 U.S. at 623.
205. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009, 1031 (D. Alaska
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A. Voluntary Cession or Act of Congress
What are the specific methods by which Congress extinguishes
aboriginal title? The traditional method is unambiguous: "Ordinarily,
Indian title is extinguished by cession under treaty or act of Con-
gress, and the land ceases to be Indian country when the cession
becomes effective. 20 7 This formal act of cession is the "usual" method
of extinguishment.208
Once a treaty between a tribe and the United States has been ratified,
aboriginal title to lands subject to the treaty is extinguished. ' 9 Even
an arguably ambiguous treaty cession has been found to have
extinguished Indian title. In Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians of
Minnesota v. United States, the United States agreed to purchase
700,000 acres of land from the Pillagers in exchange for $19,000. 21"
Although a clause in the treaty stipulated that "the country hereby
ceded shall be held by the United States as Indian land, until other-
wise ordered by the President," the court rejected the argument of
the tribe that the land was held in trust for them. 21' The treaty acted
as a relinquishment of further claims to the area, since the treaty
also contained language that the Pillagers "hereby sell and cede" the
land, thereby passing the entire interest in the land to the federal
government. "'
Congress can also extinguish title by legislation. In fact, after 1871,
no further treaties with Indian tribes were authorized." 3 Even before
1871, Congress enacted legislation designed to extinguish aboriginal
title. 14 After 1871, Congress enacted many statutes that transferred
1977), aff'd. 612 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. den., sub norn., Inupiat Community of the
Arctic Slope v. Atlantic Richfield, Co., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 354;
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Lac Courte
Oreilles, 700 F.2d at 351.
207. United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 396 F. Supp. 473, 479 (D.S. Dak. 1951),
(citing F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 16 (1953)) (emphasis in Court's opinion); See Newton,
At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered 31 HAST. L.J. 1215, 1228 (1980).
208. See Bennett County, 394 F.2d at 11; Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 373; Newton, supra
note 207 at 1228; F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 51-67 (G.P.O. 1942) (hereinafter
1942 COHEN); 1958 COHEN, supra note 101, at 174-212.
209. See, e.g., Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877); Buttz v. Northern Pacific
Railroad, 119 U.S. 55, 69-70 (1886); Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 406 (1896).
210. See Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 428 F. 2d 1274, 1275 (Ct.
Cl. 1974).
211. Id. at 1278.
212. Id.
213. See Act of March 3, 1871, see. 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as carried forward at
25 U.S.C. §71).
214. See Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 350 (Land Claims Act contained machinery for extinguish-
ment of Indian title); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157,
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Indian lands free of any claim of Indian title.2"5 The most recent of
these statutes is the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 2 6 That act
retroactively validated selections of land made by the State of Alaska
prior to enactment,21 7 and was specifically intended to extinguish
aboriginal title.2 8
With respect to the lands received by the states by virtue of their
sovereignty, 9 the operation of the constitutional Equal-Footing 20 and
Paramount Rights 22' doctrines, in conjunction with the enactment of
the Submerged Lands Act, 222 has extinguished Indian title in a similar
fashion.223 In United States v. Holt State Bank, the United States
1167-1170 (5th Cir. 1982), reh. den. 697 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den. 464 U.S. 814
(1983) (Louisiana Claims Act extinguished aboriginal claims).
215. E.g., 1982 CoHEN, supra note 158, at 515-17; 25 U.S.C. §311 (public highways),
Act of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 254 (diminished extent of reservation); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1976).
216. See 43 U.S.C. §1601, et. seq.
217. See Edwardsen, 369 F. Supp. at 1377.
218. See Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. at 1029.
219. These lands are lying beneath tidal or navigable waters. See, e.g., Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How) 212, 221,
230 (1845).
220. Id.
221. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
222. See 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §1301 et. seq. The exception to the Submerged Lands Act
confirmation, ratification and quitclaim to the States of lands beneath navigable waters found
in 43 U.S.C. §1313 (b) for "lands beneath navigable waters held, or any interest in which
is held by the United States for the benefit of any tribe, band or group of Indians or for
individual Indians . . .' is not applicable to aboriginal title. No aboriginal title exists in the
lands concerned in the Submerged Lands Act. Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 185-87 (D. Alas. 1982), aff'd 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984). The
legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act makes plain that what was intended by this
exception were lands in which the United States holds trust title and tracts set apart for Indians
before or after the admission of the States in which they are located, not lands in which In-
dians had claims of Indian title. E.g. Joint Hearings on H. J. Res. 118 Before the Comm.
on the Judic. of the House of Rep. and a Spec. Subcomm. of the Sen. Judic. Comm. (1945)
79th cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, pp. 19-20 (letter from Secretary of Interior concerning a predecessor
resolution to the resolution finally adopted as the Submerged Lands Act).
223. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 59 (1926); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1981) (presumption in favor of sovereign ownership); United
States v. Aranson, 696 F.2d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. den., sub. nom, Colorado River
Indian Tribes v. Aranson, 464 U.S. 982, 104 S. Ct. 423 (1983); Inupiat Community of the
Arctic Slope, 548 F. Supp. at 186-87; United States v. Ashton, 170 F. 509, 520 (Cir. Crt.
W.D. Wash. 1909); Sub. Nom. Bird, v. Ashton, 220 U.S. 604 (1911). In litigation between
the United States and the State of California about the ownership of the tidal and submerged
lands lying off California's coast, certain groups of California Indians sought to intervene claiming
they were ". . . still the owners in their own right, and free from any lawful claims of the
United States . . . or the State of California to substantial portions of the . . . tidelands
underlying the Pacific Ocean." Notice of Motion for Leave to Intervene, Petition for Interven-
tion, and Motion for Injunction and Appointment of Receiver, United States v. California,
334 U.S. 825 (1948). The United States (as well as the State of California) vigorously disputed
this claim. Importantly for purposes of this article, the United States argued, inter alia, that
the mere fact Indians may have sailed on or fished in the waters that covered the lands did
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created a reservation after Minnesota became a State.224 The Supreme
Court held, as to the navigable waters included within the reservation:
Without doubt the Indians were to have access to navigable waters
and to be entitled to use them in accustomed ways; but these were
common rights vouchsafed to all, whether white or Indian ... and
emphasized in the enabling act under which [the state] was admitted
as a state . . . which declared that the rivers and waters bounding
the state and the navigable waters leading into the same shall be
common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of
said state as to all other citizens of the United States.2 1
B. Force
Despite "the policy of the Congress, continued throughout our
history, to extinguish Indian title through negotiation rather than by
force,"226 extinguishment by force nevertheless has been held to be
effective.227 Thus, in rejecting the claim that aboriginal title survived
because the Indians were removed from their lands by military opera-
tions waged against them by the United States, the Ninth Circuit noted
that "the military action of the mid-nineteenth century is a strong
not provide any basis of title to the seabed. Intervention was denied. United States v. Califor-
nia, 334 U.S. 825 (1948) (memorandum for the United States in opposition). The United States
position has remained unchanged. In its brief in the Inupiat Community case the United States
stated:
Assuming, arguendo, that the Inupiat people had acquired sovereignty over and
ownership of the... Seas prior to the acquisition of Alaska by the United States
.... that sovereignty and ownership did not survive [footnote omitted]. At that
time, Alaska became part of this country and ownership of the seabed and the resources
therein was relinquished to the federal government .... [T]he doctrine of paramount
federal rights completely disposes of plaintiffs' claims in this case without the need
for an evidentiary hearing ...
It is thus obvious that the doctrine of paramount federal rights enunciated by the
Supreme Court in these cases bars any claim of the Inupiat people to [lands underly-
ing] the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Nevertheless, plaintiffs merely assert in response
that they are Indians and not States, [Citation omitted.] But even a cursory review
of the Supreme Court's rationale in the paramountcy cases [United States v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 19 and its progeny] makes it clear beyond cavil that the Inupiats can
have no better claim than the States. Federal paramountcy is an essential element
of national sovereignty, and no subordinate domestic entity, be it a State or an In-
dian tribe, may interfere with that paramountcy.
Brief for Federal Appellee, p. 10-12 Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States,
746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984).
224. See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
225. Id. at 59.
226. E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 373; 1958 CottoN, supra note 158, at 174-212.
227. See Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347; Northern Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d at 951; Strong,
518 F.2d at 564; Cf. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. at 376-379 (U.S. military refusal to
remove miners intruding into Sioux territory led to abrogation of U.S. treaty obligation and
payment of compensation).
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indication of the sovereign's intent to revoke the . . .tribe's rights
of permissive occupancy. ' 221
C. Voluntary abandonment
Although voluntary abandonment as a means of extinguishment has
not been carefully explained, voluntary abandonment of aboriginal
title by the Indians may serve to extinguish any further Indian rights
of occupancy in the land. In Santa Fe, the "creation [of a reserva-
tion] at the request of Walapais and the acceptance by them amounted
to a relinquishment of any tribal claims of lands which they might
have had outside that reservation and that relinquishment was tanta-
mount to an extinguishment by 'voluntary cession'." 22 9
Since aboriginal title can be extinguished exclusively by the United
States, to argue that acts of the Indians themselves may "extinguish"
their title may be inconsistent. 230 The Court of Claims has noted the
apparent incongruity of the Santa Fe opinion, characterizing Santa
Fe as having established an "exception" to the exclusivity principle
when the request of the Indians for land to the executive branch is
followed by acceptance of a reservation in settlement of claims.23'
Nevertheless, the Court later in the opinion accepted the possibility
that voluntary abandonment, without more, could extinguish Indian
title.232
A conceptually more precise view would treat an abandonment as
an element in disproving immemorial possession and not as a form
of extinguishment.233 The effect of abandonment-loss of aboriginal
title-is the same in either event.
228. Geminill, 535 F.2d at 1148.
229. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 357-58; Buttz, 119 U.S. at 70, "Their right of occupancy was,
in effect, abandoned and full consideration for it being afterwards paid, it could not be resum-
ed." Id. See Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); Williams v. City
of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437 (1917); County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. 1265. n. 9 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
230. In County of Oneida, the Supreme Court narrowly re-affirmed this principle. County
of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1265. Responding to Justice Stevens' dissent that laches may be a
defense in Indian title claims litigation, the majority noted that, in earlier cases, the Court
had indicated that extinguishment required a sovereign act. County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at
1257, n.16.
231. See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 490 F.2d at 947, n.23.
232. See id. at 947-948. However, the Court rejected the argument for lack of evidence.
Id. at 948.
233. See Quapaw Tribe of Indians v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1954),
rev'd on other grounds; United States v. Kiowa, 166 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. CL. 1958), cert. den.
359 U.S. 354 (1959).
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D. Incorporation of aboriginal lands into public domain
Incorporation of aboriginal lands into public lands managed by the
United States, such as forest reserves, will also serve to extinguish
aboriginal title to those lands. In one case, the dates when aboriginal
areas were included by the United States in a Forest Reserve and a
grazing district served as applicable dates for the determination of
the value of the tribes' former lands.23 ' In Plamondon v. United States,
plaintiff conceded, and the Claims Commission agreed, that the
incorporation of 550,000 acres of tribal land into public forest reserves
acted to extinguish aboriginal title. 2"
E. Grants to third parties
Grants of aboriginal lands made by the United States to the
individual states and other third parties weigh heavily in the deter-
mination of whether there is an intent to extinguish the tribal right
of occupancy. The grant of public lands to a state for public school
lands is conceded to have effectively extinguished Indian title at that
date. 23 6 In another case, the cession to another tribe of land in which
aboriginal title was-later claimed, was an important factor in deter-
mining that Indian title had been extinguished. 237
A less settled question is the effect upon aboriginal title of encroach-
ment of settlers, whether by virtue of a patent issued by the United
States or simply by acquiescence of the United States. Some cases
have held that surveying an area, or other acts preparatory to settle-
ment, do not by themselves affect aboriginal title.238 Neither does the
expectation of future parcel-by-parcel settlement alone extinguish Indian
ownership. 239 Similarly, the unilateral acts of citizens in settling on
Indian title lands do not end aboriginal ownership.240 These cases hold
that even "authorized settlement is only one factor to be taken into
account in determining when Indian title ceased." 2 "
234. See Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1391-1392.
235. See Plamondon, 467 F.2d at 936. See also Genmnill, 535 F.2d at 1149; Tlingit and
Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452, 468 (Ct. CI.) (1959); Sac & Fox
Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 315 F.2d at 901; Northern Paiute Nation,
490 F.2d at 957; Strong, 518 F.2d at 564.
236. See Plamondon 467 F.2d at 936.
237. See Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians, Minn., 428 F.2d at 1278.
238. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States. 494 F.2d 1386,
1391 (Ct. CI. 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Plamondon, 467 F.2d at 937-38.
239. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, 494 F.2d at 1391.
240. See Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 490 F.2d at 947.
241. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, 494 F.2d at 1391.
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Generally, when the United States opens up aboriginal lands for
settlement or homesteading, the cumulative effect of this action is
to extinguish the Indian rights of occupancy. While extinguishment
by this method generally contradicts the rule that extinguishment be
plain and unambiguous, the cases do suggest that opening up lands
for settlement can effectively terminate Indian title. Thus, in Alcea
Band of Tillamooks v. United States,242 when the government
negotiated treaties with four tribes:
they did not await ratification before taking the lands, but proceeded
immediately after the treaty was signed to regard and treat the lands
claimed by the [tribes] as public lands open to public homestead
and settlement, except as conditionally withdrawn and reserved by
the Executive Order . . . . This action, subsequently confirmed by
the Congress, was a taking of the lands and the original Indian use
and occupancy title. 243
In Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians, the opening of the con-
tested lands to settlers under the Homestead Act of 1864 was one
transaction upon which the Court of Claims relied in finding an
extinguishment.2 44 In Plamondon, a Presidential proclamation that
offered up for sale fourteen percent of the plaintiffs' aboriginal lands
extinguished Indian title to them because the subsequent white settle-
ment effectively deprived the Indians of their use and occupancy of
the lands.2
45
In United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, the Court of Claims
affirmed the date of taking as the dates of the miners' unauthorized
entries and staking of claims on aboriginal lands, acts that were later
ratified by Congress in retroactively validating the miners' claims.
246
Similarly, the dates that aboriginal lands of the Creek Nation were
erroneously patented to settlers were the dates of the taking in Creek
Nation v. United States.247 Finally, a recent Ninth Circuit case held
that although the enactment of the homestead laws themselves did
not extinguish aboriginal title, the issuance of patents pursuant to
that act would extinguish title to the land actually patented.24 8
242. 59 F. Supp. 934, aff'd 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
243. Id. at 967. The similarity between the United States' treatment of the Tillamooks and
its treatment of the California Indians is striking. See supra notes 79- 120 and accompanying text.
244. See Pillager Bands of Chippewa Indians, 428 F.2d at 1278.
245. See Plamondon, 467 F.2d at 936-37; Ashton, 170 F. at 513 ("Oregon Donation Law"
extinguished aboriginal title).
246. See Northern Paiute Nation, 490 F.2d at 958.
247. Creek Nation, 302 U.S. at 621.
248. See Dann II, 706 F.2d at 930.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
F. Reservations
The effect of the establishment of a reservation on aboriginal title
is ambiguous. As noted in Santa Fe, when a reservation is created
by the federal government at the request of the tribe, the subsequent
acceptance by the tribe of the reservation may serve to extinguish
prior aboriginal title claims." ' However, as to an earlier reservation
created for the tribe, the Santa Fe Court found "no indication that
Congress by creating that reservation intended to extinguish all of
the rights which the Walapai had in their ancestral home." 2 '
This reluctance to find an extinguishment by the creation of a reser-
vation in the absence of strong congressional intent is demonstrated
in Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States.25'
The authorization for the establishment of the Gila River Reserva-
tion only provided that an area be surveyed and set aside as a reser-
vation. "Nothing is said about extinction of Indian title or cutting
off the Indians from other territory they were using. '252 Consequently,
establishment of this Indian reservation did not alone extinguish the
Indians' right of occupancy in other lands they held. Unable to find
any express indication from Congress as to extinguishment, however,
the Court chose the date of the greatest expansion of the reservation
as the date of "taking." The Court concluded that the expansion
reflected the government's belief that all rightful Indian land was within
the reservation. 253
Likewise, in Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the
establishment of a reservation did not extinguish Indian title in other
lands, even though the tribe had petitioned for a reservation six years
previously.2 54 The court found no indication that this Executive Order
reservation fulfilled the Chippewas' request, or that the reservation
so established was ever "accepted" by the Chippewas as a settlement
of their land claims.255
The difficulties that courts have had in finding an extinguishment
in the governmental authorization of settlement on reservations was
demonstrated in United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso.216 Three
tribes presented consolidated claims for compensation for the taking
249. 314 U.S. at 358.
250. Id. at 353.
251. 494 F.2d at 1389.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1393-94.
254. 490 F.2d at 947.
255. Id.
256. 513 F.2d 1383.
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of aboriginal lands in New Mexico. Noting that the date title is
extinguished depends upon the particular facts, circumstances and
history of each case, the Court of Claims evaluated the transactions
between the tribes and the federal government."z 7 The court rejected
the argument of the United States that the issuance of patents in con-
firmation of land grants made by the Mexican government to certain
Indian pueblos, like the creation of a reservation, served to extinguish
title, because the issuance showed an intent to extinguis t aboriginal
title outside of the pueblo boundaries. The court stated:
It should be clear by now that the creation of an Indian reservation
does not invariably extinguish aboriginal title claims to outlying areas
.... However, the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the establishment of a reservation in a given historical context may
be such that the event will be deemed to have constituted a relin-
quishment of tribal claims to lands outside the reservation.2 8
Thus, Indian settlement on a reservation was to be construed as an
abandonment of claims only "when the specific circumstances war-
rant the conclusion. " 25 9 Extinguishment could not be implied from
the issuance of confirmatory patents alone because the United States
was obliged under principles of international law to confirm the bona
fide grants of a prior sovereign to Indians. That situation was
distinguished from a case in which the government established an
Indian reservation without any legal duty to do so.260
The court also rejected a later date advanced by the government,
which contended that "the interruption of Indian occupancy by non-
Indians - caused by white settlement under public land laws and
land grants to non-Indians by prior sovereigns - had constituted such
a substantial intervention as to effectuate an extinguishment of title
over the entire area. ' 2 6' Although, "unquestionably, the impact of
authorized white settlement upon an Indian way of life in aboriginal
areas may serve as an important indicator of when aboriginal title
was lost," 2 62 the lack of express intent to extinguish title, together
with the declared policy of protecting unextinguished Indian title in
New Mexico in this period, negated an intent to extinguish.2 63 Instead,
the court found an extinguishment based on the average dates of entries
257. Id. at 1387.
258. Id. at 1388.
259. Id., (citing Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas, 490 F.2d at 946).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1390.
262. Id.
263. Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
made under the various public land laws as well as the patent dates
for mineral claims.2 6 Averaging dates of encroachment was a rational
basis for inferring "confiscation" of all Indian lands.265
With these methods of extinguishment in mind, this article will next
consider the principal actions that evidence the intent of the United
States concerning Indian title in California.
EXTINGUISHMIENT IN CAUFORNIA
The dealing of the United States with the California Indians has
extinguished Indian title in California. Nevertheless, the less-than-
straightforward approach taken by the United States concerning Indian
title in California may raise unwarranted hope that aboriginal title
still has some remaining viability in California. Consequently, clarifica-
tion as to exactly how and when extinguishment was effected is not
merely an academic exercise; the time and method of the alleged ex-
tinguishment is of practical legal importance for those who would
claim or dispute that aboriginal title has never been extinguished. Each
of the significant events and actions will be scrutinized.
A. The Land Claims Act
The enactment of the Land Claims Act shortly after statehood is
the most significant congressional act of extinguishment in
California.266 Recall that the Land Claims Act required that all persons
claiming lands in California by any right derived from the Spanish
or Mexican government had to present their claim to the Land Com-
missioners. All valid claims had to be confirmed and patents issued.
Claims not brought within the two year limitation passed into the
public domain.267
The effect of the Land Claims Act on aboriginal title has been
subject to two conflicting interpretations. One argument is that the
Act required all claims, including aboriginal title claims, to be con-
firmed. Thus, the failure of the Indians to present their aboriginal
264. Id. at 1391.
265. Id.
266. This discussion is limited to the effect of the Land Claims Act. However, other con-
gressional acts, confirmed by relatively recent legislation, also extinguished any claims of aboriginal
title in the State of California in lands underlying navigable waters. See supra notes 219-25
and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
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title claims meant that such title had forevermore been extinguished.26
On the other hand, the language of the Land Claims Act that "each
and every person claiming lands in California by nature of any right
derived from the Spanish or Mexican government shall present the
same . . . '269 has been said to mean that the Act applied only to
lands that were directly granted by the prior sovereign.27 Thus nar-
rowly construed, the Land Claims Act left aboriginal title intact. Since
aboriginal title was not "derived" from any act of the prior govern-
ments, aboriginal claims for lands need not have been presented for
confirmation.27
The ambiguous language of this section of the statute is not the
only reason urged for this latter interpretation. An argument can be
made in support of the narrower view that Congress could not have
intended that the Indians should present their aboriginal title claims
when there was no realistic likelihood that the Indians would be
notified of the need to present those claims. The only reference in
the Land Claims Act to Indians was to those civilized Indians under
the influence of the Catholic missionaries, and not to the "uncivilized"
tribes occupying most of the land in California. 272 In addition, the
requirement of section 16 of the Act to report on Mission Indian
title does not seem to support the conclusion that a direction to
investigate tenure under Mission Indian title compelled the Indians,
holding by right of possession under other laws, to present claims
to the Land Commission.2" Finally, the Act of March 3, 1853 limited
post-1853 settlement on land occupied or possessed by any Indian
tribe,274 thereby arguably implying that Indian title was not extinguished
by virtue of the Land Claims Act.27'
The above arguments, based on a rigid statutory construction of
the Land Claims Act, were first substantially undermined in an early
case construing the effect of the Land Claims Act. In Botillier v.
268. See, e.g., Barker, 181 U.S. at 490-93.
269. 9 Stat. 631, 632.
270. See United States v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 473-74 (1924); KENNEY,
supra note 45 at 20; Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 587.
271. See KENNEY, supra note 45 at 20.
272. See id.; see also Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 587; Harvey v. Barker, 126 Cal.
262, 278 (1899) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
273. See Byrne, 74 Cal. at 639; Title Insur. Co., 265 U.S. at 476.
274. See 10 Stat. 244, 246-47.
275. See 1982 Cohen, supra note 158, at 518. But see supra note 115 and infra note 285
and accompanying text.
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Dominguez, 76 plaintiff claimed land based on a "perfect title" received
from the Mexican government but never presented for confirmation
as required by the Land Claims Act. Much the same arguments have
been made on behalf of California Indians claiming, by virtue of
aboriginal occupancy, a "perfect title." The Supreme Court, in denying
the plaintiff ownership, found nothing in the Land Claims Act implied
an exclusion of "perfect claims" from jurisdiction of the Land
Commissioners. 277 In so holding, the Court determined that the main
purpose of the Land Claims Act was to separate and distinguish the
lands that the United States owned as property as a result of the
Mexican Cession, the public domain of the United States, from those
lands that belonged to private parties under a claim of right derived
from the Spanish or Mexican government .27  The argument can be
made that separating and distinguishing, claims by Indians by virtue
of Indian title lands was unnecessary, 79 because the fee to aboriginal
title lands was already in the United States. The purpose of the Land
Claims Act as established in Botiller, however, was not limited to
fulfilling the promise made in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to
protect existing private rights of ownership of Mexican citizens living
in the ceded territories. This purpose of the Land Claims Act was
coupled with another:
The primary purpose of the [Land] Claims Act was the performance
by the United States of its treaty obligations to quiet the title of
the claimants under Spanish and Mexican grants. But as a necessary
consequence of proceeding before the Commission, and one incidental
to the determination of the validity of titles of such claimants, was
a determination whether, by the cession, the lands in question had
become part of the public domain .... 280
The manner in which the Land Claims Act operated implemented
this dual purpose. Persons claiming under a valid Spanish or Mexican
276. 130 U.S. 238 (1888).
277. Id. at 247.
278. Id. at 249.
279. No similar intent was expressed in the instructions made to the Commissioners who
heard claims filed under the Act. The Commissioners were told:
The growth and prosperity of California materially depends upon a speedy and just
settlement of the claims to lands within her limits, and the separation of all private
property from the public domain, so that the public lands in that State may be disposed
of as Congress may hereafter direct, without danger of conflict of title, or interference
with the rights of individuals.
Report of the Secretary of the Interior, Feb. 3, 1852, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 26,
Ser. 614 at 2 (1852). By claimants furnishing the United States with evidence of what was asserted
to be private property, the United States could ascertain what was undisputed public land.
Id. at 5.
280. United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 512 (1938).
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grant would have their valid titles confirmed as promised. In order
to avoid the prospect of centuries-old title disputes, however, lands
occupied by those without confirmed title would pass into the public
domain. So construed, the Land Claims Act was intended to affect
all claims of title in California, even claims for aboriginal title. 8 '
As the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Land Claims Act was not
indifferent to property rights of Indians; 28 2 but the Land Claims Act
was unmistakably intended to have the effect of extinguishing all titles
not presented. Congress could hardly be indifferent to the upheaval
in California that resulted from the Gold Rush. Security of land titles
was essential to the development of the mines and the other resources
of California. 2 3 To allow land claims, including Indian title claims,
to persist would prevent the prompt and orderly development and
growth of California.
Despite the appeal of arguments in support of a narrow construc-
tion of the Land Claims Act, cases interpreting the effect of the Act
on Indian title confirm that the narrow view has not prevailed. Cali-
fornia courts initially provided conflicting rulings. In Thompson v.
Doaksum, the California Supreme Court held that a tribe of Indians
claiming aboriginal title could not connect their title to a recognition
of title by the United States because they failed to present their
aboriginal title claims to the Land Commissioners. Thus, their land
became part of the public domain subject to later preemption.28 4 This
holding implicitly rejects the argument 285 that the Act of 1853, which
authorized preemption of public domain lands in California, somehow
recognized the continuing existence of aboriginal title.
281. Congress was aware of this intended result. In speaking against section 13 of the Land
Claims Act that held all unpresented titles were to become part of the public domain, Senator
Benton stated:
Now, what proportion of the land claims in the State of California will [this section]
involve... ?... Look ... at section 8th, and you will there find that 'each and
every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any rights or title derived from
Mexican or Spanish Government, shall present the same to said commissioners...'
These are the words of the section to which the two cases of forfeiture apply; and
they include all the claims of everybody! Who is left behind? What man, what woman,
what child, what Indian is left behind, when 'each and every person' is included?
What land is left behind? None!
Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess. 362 (1851). The amendment proposed by Benton that
would have confirmed, without the necessity of presenting a claim to the Land Commissioners,
certain Spanish and Mexican grants, including grants made to Indians, was defeated. Id. at 408.
282. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
284. See Thompson v. Doaksum, 68 Cal. 593, 597 (1886).
285. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
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Just two years later in Byrne v. Alas,286 the same court appeared
to come to a different conclusion. At issue was land included within
a confirmed Mexican land grant claimed by "Mission or Pueblo
Indians."28 ' The Court agreed that both Mexican and Spanish law
protected Indians in their occupancy of the land they needed and
tilled,288 but noted that the Mexican land grant at issue specifically
provided that the grantee ". . . shall in no way disturb nor molest
the Indians who are established or living thereon .. .".289 Thus, the
Court held that the United States patent confirmed only fee title,
burdened with the rights of the Indians29 and that since the lands
were within a confirmed grant the Indians did not have to present
their claim to the Land Commissioners.29' The Court distinguished
Thompson v. Doaksum because "[tlhe Indians interested in that case
were not Pueblo... Indians and no duty of ascertaining their rights
devolved upon the land commission. "292
About eleven years later, the California Supreme Court in Harvey
v. Barker eliminated the distinction the Court found important in
Byrne. The Harvey Court held that even Mission Indians who failed
to present their claim to the Land Commissioners were barred from
proving their title claims.2 93 The Harvey court distinguished Byrne
because, unlike Byrne, an investigation showed the land in Harvey
had been vacant at the time of the Mexican grant and the clause refer-
ring to the rights of Indians was not included in the Harvey grant.294
The Court also explained that, in light of later cases such as Botillier
v. Dominguez,295 Byrne was no longer good authority for the pro-
position that holders of "perfect title" in 1850 did not need to present
their title to the Land Commissioners for confirmation.296 Since a
claim of aboriginal title, "perfect" or not, was a "right to possess,
occupy or use land," the claim should have been presented to the
Land Commissioners.2 97 To finally resolve the issue the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
286. Byrne v. Alas, 74 Cal. at 628.
287. Id. at 630.
288. Id. at 634.
289. Id. at 635, 637.
290. Id. at 638.
291. Id. at 640.
292. Id.
293. Harvey v. Barker, 126 Cal. 262, 277-78 (1899).
294. Id. at 269-71.
295. 130 U.S. 238.
296. Harvey, 126 Cal. at 271.
297. Id. at 274-75.
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In Barker v. Harvey, the Supreme Court characterized the claim
of the Indians as ". . . a right of permanent occupancy by virtue
of the alleged fact they are Mission Indians, so called, and had been
in occupation of the premises long before the Mexican grants [later
confirmed by the United States] . . ." which occupation the Indians
claimed was preserved and protected by general laws of Mexico.2 98
After upholding the power of the United States to enact the Land
Claims Act, 99 the Court held that the Indians had abandoned their
claims by failing to present them to the Land Commissioners. 00
The Barker decision supported the conclusion of the Court with
reasoning that has retained its impact to this day:
If these Indians had any claims founded on the action of the Mex-
ican government, they abandoned them by not presenting them to
the [land] commission for consideration, and they could not,
therefore, . . . 'resist successfully any action of the government in
disposing of the property.' If it be said that the Indians do not claim
the fee, but only the right of occupation, and, therefore, they do
not come within the provisions of section 8 as persons 'claiming
lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived from the
Spanish or Mexican government,' it may be replied that a claim of
a right to permanent occupancy of land is one of far-reaching effect,
and it could not well be said that lands which were burdened with
a right of permanent occupancy were a part of the public domain
and subject to the full disposal of the United States. There is an
essential difference between the power of the United States over lands
to which it has had full title, and of which it has given to an Indian
tribe a temporary occupancy, and that over lands which were sub-
jected by the action of some prior government to a right of perma-
nent occupancy, for in the latter case the right, which is one of
private property, antecedes and is superior to the title of this govern-
ment, and limits necessarily its power of disposal. Surely a claimant
would have little reason for presenting to the land commission his
claim to land, and securing a confirmation of that claim, if the only
result was to transfer the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian
right of permanent occupancy."'
This would seem to dispose of any argument that the Court only
held that claims "founded on the action of the Mexican government"
needed to be presented to the Land Commissioners or be lost. The
Court found that any claims of a "right of permanent occupancy"
298. Barker, 181 U.S. at 482.
299. Id. at 487-90.
300. Id. at 490-91.
301. Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added).
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also were lost if not presented to and confirmed under the Land Claims
Act. 302
In later decisions, the Barker opinion has been examined and con-
tinually relied on for the proposition that the Land Claims Act
extinguished aboriginal title.30 3
In United States v. Title Insurance and Trust Co. ,304 the Supreme
Court was asked to reassess the Barker holding. In Title Insurance
the United States, on behalf of Indians, sought to establish aboriginal
title to land claimed by defendants under a grant by the Mexican
government and confirmed pursuant to the Land Claims Act. 3" The
United States urged that Indian title was also recognized by a special
provision in the Mexican grant which, like the grant concerned in
Byrne v. Alas,30 6 protected the Indians from interference in their
occupancy.30 7 The United States also argued that the Land Claims
Act did not require tribal Indians to present their occupancy title to
the Land Commissioners in order to avoid losing the claim.30 In ad-
dition, the United States asserted that the Barker holding was un-
necessarily broad as evidence in Barker showed that the Indians had
abandoned the land in dispute before the land was granted.30 9
Considering that the United States, rather than a private litigant
was urging these propositions, the rather summary opinion of the
Supreme Court 310 is surprising. The Supreme Court reiterated the prior
holding in Barker that an aboriginal title claim was abandoned by
the failure of the Indians to present the claim before the Land Com-
missioners.31" ' The Court further rejected the argument made by the
United States that Barker was decided on a non-essential ground .22
Like Barker, Title Insurance found that the Land Claims Act ex-
tinguished unconfirmed Indian title claims. In fact, the concern of
the Court with establishing the certainty of title to land in California
reinforced the conclusion that the Land Claims Act in fact barred
all claims not presented and confirmed:
The [Barker] decision was given twenty-three years ago and affected
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 592; Donahue v. Butz, 363 F. Supp.
1316, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Goodrich, supra note 96, at 100; KENNEY, supra note 45, at 20.
304. 265 U.S. 472 (1923).
305. Id. at 481.
306. Byrne, 74 Cal. at 635.
307. See Title Insur. Co., 265 U.S. at 473.
308. Id. at 475.
309. Id. at 477-79.
310. The opinion is only six pages long. Most of the text is taken up with a restatement
and quotation of Barker. Id. at 482.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 486.
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many tracts of land in California, particularly in the southern part
of the State. In the meantime there has been a continuous growth
and development in that section, land values have enhanced, and
there have been many transfers. Naturally there has been reliance
on the decision. The defendants in this case purchased fifteen years
after it was made. It has become a rule of property, and to disturb
it now would be fraught with many injurious results. 3
Just months later, the District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed the
holdings of Barker and Title Insurance.3"' In Super v. Work, Karuk
Indians sought to enjoin the United States from issuing permits for
the use of lands within the Klamath National Forest that would
interfere with the Karuks' aboriginal use and occupancy.3"5 The Court
held that by failing to bring their claims before the Commission, the
Karuk tribe abandoned their aboriginal title claim. 31 6 Citing Barker
and Title Insurance, the Court stated:
No claim was ever made on behalf of plaintiff Indians under the
Act of 1851, and they therefore must be treated as having lost,
through abandonment, any claim which they may have had.3"7
Unlike Barker and Title Insurance (both of which concerned Mission
Indians)," ' the Karuks were roving bands. 3' 9 The Court, however,
found this fact made no difference, and determined that the Land
Claims Act also extinguished such aboriginal title claims in Califor-
nia.32
0
Another case decided by the Supreme Court shortly before Title
Insurance and Super appears on first reading to reach the opposite
conclusion. In Cramer v. United States,32' the Supreme Court appeared
to render a conflicting construction of the Land Claims Act. In
Cramer, the United States brought suit on behalf of three Indians
who had continuously occupied certain lands in California since at
least 1859, by enclosing and actually using the land. 2 2 Although these
lands were included in a United States patent to defendant's
predecessors, the patent excepted from the grant such lands found
313. Id.
314. See Super v. Work, 3 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (submitted December 5, 1924,
decided January 5, 1925), aff'd. 271 U.S. 643 (1926). Title Insurance was decided on June
9, 1924. See Title Insur. Co., 265 U.S. at 472.
315. See Super, 3 F.2d at 90.
316. Id. at 91.
317. Id.
318. See Barker, 181 U.S. at 482; United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 288 F. 821,
822 (9th Cir. 1923), aff'd., 265 U.S. 472 (1924).
319. See Super, 3 F.2d at 91.
320. Id.
321. 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
322. Id. at 221-22.
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to be "granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, pre-
empted or otherwise disposed of. '323 The United States sought to
cancel the patent insofar as the patent purported to convey the land
occupied by the Indians.324
The Court noted that the policy of the federal government had been
to respect Indian rights of occupancy but that policy had in mind
" original nomadic tribal occupancy . . . -. "2I The Cramer court
expanded this policy to include ". . . individual Indian occupancy
as well . "..."326 That this newly minted "individual Indian occupancy"
was not the same as aborignal occupancy is clear from the opinion'
of the Court. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the Indians
occupied the land ". . . with the implied consent of the United States
and in accordance with its policies." '327 Thus, considering the effect
of the Land Claims Act, the Court stated that:
... the act plainly had no application. The Indians here concerned
do not belong to any of the classes described therein and their claims
were in no way derived from the Spanish or Mexican governments.
Moreover, it does not appear that these Indians were occupying the
lands . . . when the [Land Claims] Act was passed. [Thus, there
was no need to file a claim before the Land Commissioners.' 2 8]
This language establishes that Cramer was not concerned with
aboriginal title and whether claims for aboriginal title were required
to be presented to the Land Commissioners or be lost. This conclu-
sion is strongly supported by the fact that in the Title Insurance case,
argued very shortly after Cramer was decided, the United States did
not cite Cramer to support the arguments that aboriginal claims did
not have to be presented to the Land Commissioners pursuant to the
Land Claims Act.3 29
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 225.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 233. The brief of the United States clearly indicates that the United States was
not urging aboriginal occupancy:
But it is immaterial whether the land was occupied by a band of Indians, because
we contend that the occupancy of the two families was sufficient to except the lands
from the grant to railroad company. We submit that the Indian right of occupancy,
of which so much is said in various Acts of Congress and court decisions, is the
mere right to occupy as for the purpose of hunting and fishing, and that is not
the same as actual residence upon the land where the Indians live and make their
homes. The latter means more than the mere right of occupancy and that is what
we have in this case - actual residence upon and a high state of improvement of
the land.
Brief for the United States at 13-14, Cramer, 261 U.S. 219.
328. Id. at 231 (Emphasis supplied).
329. See Title Insur. Co., 265 U.S. at 475-478; Brief for the United States at 19, 24, 38,
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After Title Insurance, the question of the effect of the Land Claims
Act remained dormant for almost twenty years.33 Then, in dicta in
a case that concerned the Walapai Tribe in Arizona,331 the Supreme
Court made specific mention of the effect of the Land Claims Act
on Indian title. In determining whether the passage of a series of
acts calling for the survey of the Arizona territory and for a report
about claims to land in the Territory extinguished aboriginal title the
Court stated:
These Acts did not extinguish any Indian title based on aboriginal
occupancy which the Walapais may have had. In that respect they
were quite different from the [Land Claims Act] .... Under Sec.
13 of that Act 'all lands the claims to which shall not have been
presented' to the commissioners, appointed to receive and act upon
all petitions for confirmation of land claims, 'within two years after
the date of this act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as part
of that public domain of the United States.' This Court passed on
that Act in Barker . . . . The plaintiff there claimed under two
Mexican grants. The defendants were Indians who claimed a right
of permanent occupancy; but they had not presented their claims
to the commissioners within the time specified by Sec. 13. This Court
held that as a result of that failure their claims were barred. And
see United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., supra, 265 U.S.
472. That is to say, the Act of 1851 was interpreted as containing
machinery for extinguishment of claims, including those based on
Indian right of occupancy.332
A very recent case, in which the State of California was a party,
provides fresh evidence333 that the Supreme Court considers that the
holdings in Barker and Title Insurance remain vital today. In Summa
Corp. v. California ex rel State Lands Commission33 the State of
California claimed that the state retained a sovereign interest in a
lagoon encompassed within a patent from the United States issued
pursuant to the Land Claims Act.335 The state argued, much the same
as had the Indians in Barker and the United States in Title Insurance,
53, 68. Id.
330. In litigation concerning the 1928 Jurisdictional Act, it was noted that by virtue of
the Land Claims Act ". . . whatever lands [the Indians of California] may have claimed became
part of the public domain of the United States. Barker v. Harvey . . . , United States v.
Title Insurance & Trust Co ..... " See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 592.
331. See Santa Fe, 314 U.S. 339.
332. Id. at 350.
333. The Ninth Circuit has also recently reiterated that the Land Claims Act was intended
to extinguish unpresented aboriginal claims. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 929, n.8.
334. 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984).
335. Id. at 1756.
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that such a claim did not have to be presented in the Land Claims
Act proceedings and was therefore not extinguished by the United
States confirmatory patent.336 After reviewing Barker and Title
Insurance,337 the Supreme Court held:
• . . California cannot at this late date assert its public easement
over [Summa's] property, when [Summa's] predecessors-in-interest
had their interest confirmed without any mention of such an ease-
ment in proceedings taken pursuant to the [Land Claims Act]. The
interest claimed by California is one of such substantial magnitude
that regardless of the fact that the claim is asserted by the State
in-its sovereign capacity, this interest, like the Indian claims made
in Barker and in United States v. Title Insurance Co., must have
been presented in the [Land Claims Act] proceeding or be barred" 8
Thus, the impact of the Land Claims Act on Indian title has long
been resolved. The narrow construction sought by the Indians and
on their behalf by the United States has been consistently rejected
by the Supreme Court.339 Therefore, by 1853 the government regarded
all lands, title to which had not been presented pursuant to the Land
Claims Act, as having passed into the public domain for the pur-
poses of the future land policy of the government.
When the Land Claims Act is viewed in conjunction with the Act
of 1853 and subsequent federal actions, this conclusion is inescapable.
The Act of 1853 granted lands in the public domain, including
aboriginal lands, to the State of California and private individuals.
The adverse dominion and the later conveyance and use of these lands
by the federal government confirm that Indian title has been extinguish-
ed.3"' This extinguishment is further reflected in the government's policy
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1757.
338. Id. at 1758. Recall Barker, 181 U.S. at 491-92 used the same reasoning and virtually
the same language over eighty years before. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
339. Only dicta in one case lends credence to the narrow construction argument. In
Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1148, the Ninth Circuit noted, solely for purposes of argument, that
some support for that argument could be found in Barker and in the Act of 1853 which limited
post-1853 settlement on land "occupied or possessed by any Indian tribe." As is apparent from
the part of the opinion cited by the Ninth Circuit, Barker cannot be construed so narrowly.
In addition, no other case has ever relied on the "limitation" in the Act of 1853 as establishing
that aboriginal title still existed in public domain lands. Indeed, both state and federal courts
have upheld public domain titles based on the operation of the Land Claims Act when challenged
by Indians claiming by virtue of unpresented aboriginal title. Thompson v. Doaksum, 68 Cal.
at 597; Super, 3 F.2d at 91. Recent Ninth Circuit authority is directly contrary. Dann II, 706
F.2d at 929, n.8. Finally, in light of Summa, little doubt exists that Congress, by virtue of
the Land Claims Act, extinguished aboriginal title in California.
340. See supra notes 213-15, 234-48 and accompanying text.
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of Indian removal and its establishment of reservations. 31 Indeed,
this intent is nowhere more apparent than in the United States' actions
concerning the treaties negotiated with the California Indians.
B. The Eighteen Unratified Treaties
Closely contemporaneous with the enactment of the Land Claims
Act, Congress authorized the President to send commissioners to
California to negotiate treaties with the California Indians.3 12 The com-
missioners negotiated eighteen treaties with various groups of California
Indians3 43 calling for the cession of their aboriginal lands. ' The history
of the subsequent refusal of Congress to ratify these treaties345 not
only suggests that nonratification extinguished existing Indian title in
California but also raises doubts whether Congress ever recognized
that Indian title existed in the state.
The refusal to ratify these treaties was an act which, taken by itself,
was arguably ambiguous as to whether Congress intended that
aboriginal title be extinguished. On one hand, since the more favored
method of extinguishment has been voluntary cession through treaties,
the nonratification of the California Indian treaties arguably evinced
an intent to maintain the status quo - that is, aboriginal title would
remain intact. Indeed it appears incongruous that both ratification
and nonratification lead to an identical result - extinguishment.
Despite the seeming logic of this argument, when the circumstances
surrounding the negotiation and nonratification of the treaties are
coupled with the principles of extinguishment, it is evident that the
nonratification of the eighteen California Indian treaties is consistent
with the federal policy of extinguishing the aboriginal title of the
California Indians. In fact, the decision to commission agents to
negotiate treaties that were intended to cause the removal of Indians
from their aboriginal lands to reservations set aside for their
occupation34 6 is, in itself, an expression of Congressional intent to
341. See supra notes 229-33 (abandonment), 234-35 (incorporation into public domain),
236-248 (grants to third parties), 249-265 (reservations), and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
346. See 31st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 587, Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, p. 15 (1850) (Instructions to
California Indian Commissioners from Commissioner of Indian Affairs); 32nd Cong., Ist Sess.,
Ser. 613, Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, p. 487 (1851) (Letter O.M. Wozencroft to Luke Lea, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs).
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extinguish aboriginal title.34 7 But why, once the treaties were negotiated
and the Indians left their native lands for those promised in the treaties,
did Congress refuse to go along? Two explanations are plausible.
First, nonratification of the treaties was not a deviation from the
expressed congressional desire to extinguish Indian title in California,
but only a change in the means of doing so. Since Congress can
extinguish Indian title by any means, ratification was unnecessary if
Congress believed that the effect of the treaty negotiations had been
to extinguish Indian title, regardless of whether the treaties were
ratified. From this viewpoint, a refusal to ratify the treaties would
mean that Congress could avoid the implied promise to create the
reservations and to comply with the other terms of the treaties the
Congressional agents had negotiated. At the same time, as the Indians
left their aboriginal lands upon negotiation of the treaties without
prospect of return, the object of the treaties had been accomplished.
In fact, Congress realized that removal had already begun by the time
the treaties reached the Senate.348 Thus, some may conclude that since
the treaties were having their intended effect anyway, Congress saw
no need to ratify them. The outcome - extinguishment - was the
same. Extinguishment by this backhanded method has been given effect
by courts.349
Considering that Congress enacted the 1851 Land Claims Act while
these treaties were being negotiated, the fact that failure to ratify the
347. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text; Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 32nd Cong. Ist Sess, Ser. 613 p. 487 (1851) (letter from O.M. Wozencraft to Luke
Lea, Commissioner of Indian Affairs); (letter from Adam Johnston, Indian sub-agent to Luke
Lea, Commissioner of Indian Affairs); 1942 COHEN, supra note 208, at 62.
348. Id.
349. In Plamadon, Congress had at first expressed an intent to negotiate treaties. Plamnadon,
467 F.2d at 936. Instead Congress appropriated money for removal of the Indians from the
territory. Id. Although there was no evidence the money appropriated was actually used for
removal of the tribe, "the appropriation reveals a change in congressional policy." Id. Rather
than negotiating treaties with these tribes, Congress now intended that their aboriginal title
be extinguished by their removal from their lands. Id., (citing 25 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 450-51).
In another case the failure of Congress to ratify treaties made with four tribes did not prevent
the extinguishment of aboriginal title when the Congress continued to proceed with removal
of the Indians after the treaties had been ratified. Alcea Band of Tillamooks v. United States,
59 F. Supp. at 967. In still another case the Court of Claims found an extinguishment had
occurred when the Indians were effectively deprived of their property even though the taking
was the result of a treaty to which they were not a party. Nooksack Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 166 Ct. Cl. 717, 715 (1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 993 (1964). In an Indian Claims
Commission case, the tribe signed a treaty which was never ratified by the United States. Chinook
Tribe v. United States, 6 Ind. Cis. Com. 177 (1958). The Claims Commission found that,
notwithstanding the failure to ratify, the United States extinguished title by assuming control
over the aboriginal title area, thereby depriving the Chinooks of their lands. Id.
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eighteen treaties was not intended to recognize or affirm the continued
existence of aboriginal title becomes apparent.350 Survival of aboriginal
title would be antithetical to the frequently and fervently expressed
desire of the United States for secure land titles necessary for the
orderly development of California.35" ' Thus, nonratification is consis-
tent with the congressional intent to extinguish aboriginal title in
California.
A second and more interesting explanation can be made why
nonratification was consistent with an intent to extinguish aboriginal
title. At the time the treaties were negotiated, many persons, including
those who reported on the state of Indian title in Spanish and Mex-
ican California, believed that aboriginal title in roving bands of Indians
living outside of the missions simply never existed in California.
Therefore such Indians had no possessory land title rights requiring
legal extinction.352 This theory is seemingly at odds with the doctrine
of aboriginal title that was explicated in Johnson v. Maclntosh.353
That traditional doctrine suggested that aboriginal title was recognized
as inhering in lands occupied by Indians at the moment the "con-
quering" nation asserted dominion and took title to the lands.35 ' Thus,
assuming that Spain and Mexico recognized the existence of and had
not extinguished Indian title at the time California passed to the United
States by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the "uncivilized"
(as opposed to Mission) Indians of California would necessarily have
had aboriginal title to all those lands they had possessed since time
immemorial, without congressional acknowledgement or other further
affirmative recognition.
Yet, despite the theory that aboriginal title is inherent at the moment
of conquest, Congress had been advised through executive or con-
gressionally commissioned reports that Mexico and Spain recognized
Indian possessory rights in California only to lands the Indians actually
occupied.355 In the debates over whether agents should be sent to
negotiate treaties in California, the comments of Senator Fremont
350. See supra notes 266-341 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
352. Compare supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text with notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
353. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
354. Id.
355. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. Cohen agrees that there are conflicting
views. However, Cohen does not mention the Jones or Halleck Reports commissioned to ex-
amine that question in California. 1942 CoHEN, supra note 208 at 305. In Santa Fe, 314 U.S.
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show that Congress understood that only certain Indians had "fixed
rights of property in the lands they occupy beyond what is admitted
by this Government in its relations with its own domestic tribes .
**.356 Further, Fremont's colleague, Senator Gwin, stated somewhat
imprecisely that Mexican law did not recognize any titles in Indians."'
Indeed, when agents were finally authorized to go to California, Con-
gress wanted treaties to be negotiated that would only ". . . con-
ciliate the good feelings of the Indians, and to get them to ratify
those feelings by entering into written treaties binding on them towards
the government and each other. ' 358 Thus, the commissioners left with
the idea that termination of Indian title in California was unnecessary,
and that the object of their mission was to placate and remove the
Indians from contact with ever-encroaching settlers driven by the lure
of the Gold Rush. 359
The very fact Congress felt the need to send commissioners is an
indication that Congress recognized some right of occupancy. 360
Congressional expressions, however, contradict this possibility. After
the treaties had been negotiated and the question of ratification reached
Congress, the Senate was unwilling to concede that the California
Indians had any rights that required compensation or even recogni-
tion. This opinion is reflected in the statement given by the Chair-
man of the Senate Executive Committee regarding the reasons the
committee refused to recommend ratification:
We reject the treaties on the ground that the United States, acquir-
ing possession of the Territory from Mexico, succeeded to its rights
in the soil, and, as that Government regarded itself as the absolute
and unqualified owner of it, and held that the Indians had no
usufructary or other rights therein which were to be in any manner
respected, they, the United States, were under no obligation to treat
with the Indians occupying the same for the extinguishment of their
title.36
at 345-46, the Supreme Court held that Indian title was respected by the United States in
Mexican Cession, although the Court did not express any opinion about whether Indian aboriginal
rights were recognized under Spanish or Mexican law. See Cohen, The Spanish Origin of In-
dian Rights In the Law of the United States 31 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1, 19 (1942).
356. Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 1817 (1850). These comments are in agreement
with the findings of both the Halleck and Jones Reports and more modern commentators.
See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
358. 31st. Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 587, Sen. Exec. Doc. 1, p. 153 (1850) (Instructions to com-
missioners from Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
359. 33rd Cong., Spec. Sess., Ser. 688, Sen. Exec. Doc. 4, p. 63 (1851) (Letter from Treaty
Commissioners to Commissioner of Indian Affairs); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
360. See HoopEs, supra note 46, at 107.
361. Id. at 106.
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Indeed, executive officials from the President on down confirmed
that the California Indians had no aboriginal rights that the United
States was bound to recognize. For example, President Fillmore in
his message to Congress in December, 1852, stated:
In other parts of our territory, particular districts of country have
been set apart for the exclusive occupation of the Indians, and their
right to the lands within those limits has been acknowledged and
respected. But in California . . there has been no recognition by
the government of the exclusive right of the Indians to any part
of the country. They are, therefore, mere tenants at sufferance, and
liable to be driven from place to place at the pleasure of the whites.
The treaties which have been rejected proposed to remedy this evil,
by allotting to the different tribes districts of the country suitable
to their fixed habits of life, and sufficient for their support. This
provision, more than any other, it is believed, led to their rejection
362
And later the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated:
• . . the treaties . . . effected were never confirmed, the Senate re-
jecting them on the ground that the United States, acquiring posses-
sion of the territory from Mexico, succeeded to its rights to the soil
and, as that government regarded itself as the absolute and
unqualified owner of it, and held that the Indians had no usufruc-
ary or other right therein which were in any manner respected,
they, the United States, were under no obligation to treat with the
Indians occupying the same for the extinguishment of their title.3 63
These comments were entirely consistent with a theory that no
aboriginal rights were recognized by the United States in California
Indians and that therefore no aboriginal title existed to be extinguished.
Although no court has directly decided that aboriginal title in
California was not recognized by Spain or Mexico,3 61 one historical
footnote can be found on the subject. In a case about the aboriginal
362. Message of the President, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. 658, Sen. Exec. Doc. 1, p.
10 (1852); Report of Edward F. Beale, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, California, 32nd Cong.,
2nd Sess., Ser. 665, Sen. Exec. Doc. 57, p. 17 (1853) (Letter Gen. Hitchcock to Col. Cooper).
363. 41st Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. 1414, H. Exec. Doc. 1, pt. 3, pp. 457-368 (1869). See
also, Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. 974, p. 649
(1858)(Letter, G. Bailey, Spec. Agent, Dept. of Int. to Charles E. Mix, Comm. of Ind. Aff.);
Report of the Secretary of Interior, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 1023, Sen. Exec. Doc. 1, p.
100 (1859).
364. In dicta, Byrne v. Alas, 74 Cal. at 633-37, favorably noted the conclusions of the
Jones Report that aboriginal title was not recognized in the wild or roving bands of Indians
and that the only title recognized by Spain or Mexico was that of the "civilized Indians" con-
nected with the Missions. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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claims of Oregon Indians, while discussing the theory of aboriginal
title, the Court of Claims noted, without explanation:
Ever since the Government of the United States was first
established the United States through its legislative and executive
departments has, with one qualified exception in the case of the
Indians of California, consistently conceded and recognized that
Indians had a beneficial possessory ownership in lands used and
exclusively occupied by them, notwithstanding general consent to be
sued by the Indians on the basis of such original occupancy title
or on a treaty title was not given.3 65
Both the theory that nonratification was an alternative expression
of extinguishment, and the theory that Indians in California were
regarded as never having aboriginal rights requiring recognition by
the United States, support the conclusion that aboriginal title was
extinguished despite the lack of ratification of the eighteen treaties.
Whatever the reasons for nonratification, the attitude of the federal
government - as evidenced by the government's removal of Indians
- was repugnant to continued existence of aboriginal title and con-
firmed the fact of extinguishment. One 1853 government report on
the condition of Indians in California acknowledged that nonratifica-
tion, combined with removal, had effected an ad hoc extinguishment
of Indian title in the state.366 Since the treaties were rejected, the
Indians "remain[ed] without practical protection from laws and
treaties. '3 67 Unlike other parts of the country, where the United States
recognized aboriginal claims and protected portions of those lands
from intrusion, Indian territorial possession in California was left com-
pletely unprotected by the government after rejection of the treaties. 68
Later attempts by the United States to remedy these acts only reaf-
firm the conclusion that aboriginal title in California has been
extinguished.
C. Confirmation of Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title
1. The Jurisdictional Act of 1928
The United States' failure to protect, or, as some may suggest, the
365. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 59 F. Supp. at 962.
366. Report of Edward Beale, Sen. Doc. No. 57, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. 665, p. 2
(1852) (". . . in this way a state of things exists [in California] which is not known in other
parts of the United States, where Indian intercourse laws are enforced by the government and
Indian territorial possession is protected by the government.")
367. Id. at 1.
368. See 1942 CoHEN, supra note 355 at 62; see also, supra notes 119-31 and accompanying
text.
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deliberate policy of divesting the California Indians of their ancestral
lands to make way for the rapid and chaotic settlement of California
that followed the Gold Rush was largely unnoticed (except by Cali-
fornia Indians) for over fifty years.369 In the 1920's, litigation to assert
aboriginal rights of California Indians was brought, but failed."' The
Court in that case specially noted:
Congress may in the exercise of [plenary] power [over Indians] deter-
mine the rights of Indians to the occupancy of lands, and, if injury
occurs, the relief must be sought from Congress, and not from the
courts . . ..
The 1928 Jurisdictional Act3 2 reflected the initial response of Con-
gress to requests for relief on behalf of the California Indians.
Although the 1928 Jurisdictional Act provided limited recompense to
the Indians of California,3 73 the Act also recognized that Indian title
in California had been extinguished. The Act authorized the presen-
tation of the claims as follows:
All claims of whatsoever nature the Indians of California as defined
in ...this Act may have against the United States by reason of
lands taken from them . . . by the United States without compensa-
tion, or for the failure or refusal of the United States to compen-
sate them for their interest in lands . . . which the United States
appropriated to its own purposes without the consent of said In-
dians, may be submitted to the ...Court of Claims .... 311
The language, "by reason of lands taken from them" and "lands
...which the United States appropriated to its own purposes without
the consent of said Indians," was an acknowledgement by Congress
that aboriginal title had been extinguished, i.e., "taken. ' 3 75 Of course,
the land ceded in the eighteen unratified treaties included only a por-
tion, albeit sizeable, of the aboriginal lands in California, and the
treaties were not made with all California Indians.376 Section 1 of
369. See KENNEY, supra note 45, at 24; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV.
28, 36 (1932); see also supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
370. See Super, 3 F.2d at 91.
371. Id.
372. 25 U.S.C. §651 et. seq.
373. See supra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
374. 25 U.S.C. §652.
375. The clause in 25 U.S.C. Section 652 that "the loss to said Indians on account of
their failure to secure the lands and compensation provided for in the unratified treaties is
sufficient ground for equitable relief," further supports this conclusion. Cohen agrees that the
United States took the land. Cohen, supra note 369 at 36.
376. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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the 1928 Jurisdictional Act, however, defined the "Indians of Cali-
fornia" to include all Indians living in California on June 1, 1852,
and their living descendants. This meant that Congress assumed that
aboriginal lands had in fact been taken from all California Indians
- not just from those who were actually parties to the treaties. Such
an assumption was not unreasonable.377 In the past Congress has,
by treaty, extinguished aboriginal title to lands occupied by tribes not
parties to such treaties. 7 Alternatively, the inclusion of all the Indians
of California in the 1928 Jurisdictional Act may have meant that Con-
gress intended that the payment to the "Indians of California" by
virtue of the 1928 Jurisdictional Act would finally extinguish and com-
pensate all the Indians of California for their aboriginal title claims
even if the title of the non-treaty California Indians had not yet been
extinguished.
These arguments are supported by the opinion in the action379
brought pursuant to the 1928 Jurisdictional Act. While the Court of
Claims emphasized the equitable nature of the relief being granted,
the opinion acknowledged that the California Indians had lost their
aboriginal title. "This case does not involve the payment for land
of which the Indians had a cession, or use and occupancy. No legal
claim under any treaty or act of Congress setting aside land for the
use of the Indians of California can be sustained." 3 ' Instead, "[t]he
claim sued on is one arising under an Act of Congress that says the
promise made to these Indians in negotiating treaties with them, and
afterwards not carrying out that promise by ratification, is sufficient
to constitute an equitable claim .... 381 The Court explicitly expressed
this view of the state of aboriginal title: "These Indians did not qualify
before the Commission created by the Act of March 3, 1851 . . .
377. As Cohen noted:
In some cases payment for ceded land has long been delayed. Most of the State
of California falls within an area which various Indian tribes of that region had
undertaken to cede to the United States in a series of treaties executed in the 1850's
. . .The Federal Government took the land but the Senate refused to ratify the
treaties . . The settlement of the California land claims [for recovery of over
$5,000,000] closes a chapter in our national history. Today we can say that from
the Atlantic to the Pacific our national public domain consists .. .of lands that
we have bought from the Indians.
Cohen, supra note 369 at 36.
378. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
379. See Indians of California, 98 Ct. Cl. at 583.
380. Id. at 600.
381. Id. at 598.
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therefore, whatever lands they may have claimed became a part of
the public domain of the United States." '382
In 1852, California Indians left their aboriginal lands in reliance
on the promises made by the United States that if the Indians re-
moved from and relinquished their aboriginal lands they would receive
certain other lands and benefits. Even though the United States was
not required to compensate the Indians for the "taking" of aboriginal
lands,383 the 1928 Jurisdictional Act was based on the recognition that
the Indians of California kept their part of their bargain and therefore,
albeit belatedly and only after considerable public pressure, the United
States should honor its obligation. The judgment obtained pursuant
to the 1928 Jurisdictional Act was computed on the basis of the lands
promised in the treaties and established the intention of Congress to
place the "Indians of California" in the position they would have
been had the treaties been ratified - with the ensuing loss of their
aboriginal lands. Thus, through the 1928 Jurisdictional Act, Congress
itself confirmed that the United States had extinguished aboriginal
title of the California Indians. This was further reaffirmed by Con-
gress through later actions.
2. The Claims Commission
Advocates for the California Indians recognized the inadequacy of
the 1928 Jurisdictional Act.38' In 1946 Congress also recognized such
inadequacies and created the Claims Commission. 31 The Claims Com-
mission had jurisdiction to consider and award compensation for a
broad range of claims brought by tribes or "identifiable group[s] of
Indians" against the United States.386
The cases brought by California Indians before the Claims Com-
mission definitely and finally established that all aboriginal title had
been extinguished within California. Not only did such claims cover
all aboriginal lands in California, but the Court of Claims also upheld
the right to bring a representative action on behalf of all the "Indians
382. Id. at 592.
383. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279.
384. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 156-57 and accompanying text.
386. See 25 U.S.C. §70(a); 1982 Cohen, supra note 158, at 564. A claim can be brought
by any identifiable group. 25 U.S.C. sec. 70(i). Where the identifiable group is a tribal organiza-
tion recognized as such by the Secretary of the Interior, such organization is accorded the
exclusive privilege of representation unless fraud, collusion, or laches is shown on the part
of the tribal organization. 25 U.S.C. §70(i).
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of California. '"38' The only lands not involved in the suit brought
on behalf of the "Indians of California" ("Area A" lands), were
subject to claims for compensation by other tribal organizations. 88
Compensation awarded by the Claims Commission and paid by Con-
gress for the taking of aboriginal lands is evaluated from the date
of extinguishment. Finding an extinguishment is therefore a necessary
predicate for establishing compensation. In passing on the claim for
compensation of the Indians of California, the Claims Commission
was required to determine when and if aboriginal title was extinguished
in California. In doing so, the Claims Commission established the
date of taking - all aboriginal claims were extinguished in California
on March 3, 1853. The Claims Commission found:
The entire area here involved lies within the territory acquired of
Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo during 1848. The State
of California was admitted to the Union on September 9, 1850 (9
Stat. 452). On March 3, 1851, Congress passed the Private Land
Claims Act (9 Stat. 631) requiring registration of all land claims
within a two-year period thereafter. On March 3, 1853, Congress
passed an 'Act to Provide for the Survey of the Public Lands of
California and the Granting of Pre-emption Rights to Settlers' (10
Stat. 244). It has been previously held that by this latter Act the
defendant took such action toward the vesting in others of the fee
title to Indian land within California as was possible only by it
becoming a part of the public domain and by extinguishment of
Indian title. That date is, therefore, the date upon which Indian ti-
tle to the land here involved may be said to have been taken by
defendant [citations omitted] .389
After setting forth certain provisions of the Land Claims Act that
established the Land Commission (section 1), the Land Commissions
duties (section 8) and the consequences of the rejection for the failure
to present a claim (section 13), the Claims Commissions' findings went
on:
The Commission finds that nothing in said Act required the Indian
inhabitants of California to present their claims for their original
Indian title to California lands; that no such claims were presented,
387. See Clyde F. Thompson, 122 Ct. Cl. at 357, 361.
388. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text. Judgments awarding compensation
for those claims were also ordered. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
389. Thompson, 8 Ind. Cls. Com. at 2. Order Clarifying and Supplementing Findings of
Fact and Amending Interlocutory Order of July 3, 1959, p. 2 (1959). This order was made
at the request of the Indians of California and after objections of the United States. Id. at 1.
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or presented by the California Indians and rejected by the Commis-
sioners, or finally decided to be invalid by the District or Supreme
Court . . .
11. The Commission finds that the ancestors of the group known
as the Indians of California held original Indian title to the lands
in Area B, except the Spanish and Mexican grants made therein .
. . and never voluntarily abandoned any lands therein prior to the
taking thereof by the United States; that such Indian title was
extinguished by the United States under the provisions of Section
13 of the [Land Claims Act], and by the Act of March 3, 1853,
the latter being the date of taking by the United States .... 311
On their face these findings appear confusing, even contradictory.
The Claims Commission found that the Land Claims Act extinguished
aboriginal title, yet simultaneously appeared to conclude that the Land
Claims Act did not require the Indians of California to present their
claims. Careful reading of the opinion alleviates the confusion and
dispels the contradictions.
The confusion stems from the Claims Commission's imprecise use
of the word "claim" in its response to a contention of the United
States. The Claims Commission used this word as a shorthand reference
to the Indians of California' claim for compensation for the value
of the land taken from them as distinguished from a claim of
aboriginal title.
The United States had argued that the petitioners failed to present
"their claim" under the Land Claims Act the petitioners lost whatever
rights they had to the land involved, including the right to compen-
sation for the monetary value of the land taken."' The focus of the
Claims Commission's discussion of the Land Claims Act was therefore
directed to whether the Land Claims Act had extinguished the Indians
of California' claim for compensation for the loss of their aboriginal
title.
The Claims Commission found that the Land Claims Act did not
bar the Indians of California claim for compensation. After first noting
390. Id. at 3. This finding had also been iterated by the Commission in other suits brought
by various California tribes for compensation for the taking of their aboriginal lands. Pit River
Indians v. United States, 7 Ind. Cis. Corn. 815, 848 (1959); Mohave Tribe v. United States,
7 Ind. Cis. Com. 219, 242-43 (1959); Washoe Indians v. United States, 7 Ind. Cis. Com. 266,
280, 281 (1959).
391. See Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Com. at 23. This contention was not far-fetched. To avoid
this argument the 1928 Jurisdictional Act specifically exempted the "Indians of California"
claim pursuant to that Act from such a defense. 25 U.S.C. §653.
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that the claim presented to the Commission "is one based upon
aboriginal title" and then after reviewing the doctrine of aboriginal
title, the Commission found that a "claim for lands" based upon
original Indian title did not come within the class of claims required
to be presented under Section 8 of the Land Claims Act as such rights
were not derivative from the Spanish or Mexican government.392 After
discussing the authority (Barker and Title Insurance) relied upon by
the United States in support of the position that the petitioners lost
all their land rights under the 1851 Act, including the right to com-
pensation, the Claims Commission concluded that the Indians of
California had not lost their right to present the "present claim" under
the Indian Claims Commission Act because of the failure of their
predecessors to present a claim under the Land Claims Act more than
100 years before.
We are of the opinion that the Indians of California were not
required by the 1851 Act to present their present claim for confir-
mation and that they are not barred by such failure or said Act
from asserting the present claim. 393
Thus, the Claims Commission held that the "present claim" of the
"Indians of California," a claim for compensation for "the value
of all lands within the boundaries of the present State of California, ' 394
was not required to be presented under the Land Claims Act and
was not barred by the provisions of the Act. The Claims Commis-
sion did not state nor imply that the claim for aboriginal title itself
was not barred by the Land Claims Act. In fact, the Claims Com-
mission specifically found that the Land Claims Act had extinguished
aboriginal title. After quoting Section 13 of the Land Claims Act the
Claims Commission stated:
The plain effect of [Section 13 of the Land Claims Act] when read
in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act, is that all lands
in California not included in valid private land grants . . . became
vested in the United States free of Indian rights. 95
The Claims Commission further stated: "Since no provisions were made
in the 1851 Act for presenting claims for lands in California held
and occupied by the aboriginal inhabitants thereof, the Indians of
392. See Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 24-26.
393. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
394. Id. at 4; Thompson, I Ind. Cis. Comm. at 370 ("recovery is sought"); Clyde F. Thomp-
son, 122 Ct. Cl. at 350 (". . . [the] claim presented by the petition ... is for compensation
for certain lands . . . alleged to have been taken by the United States .
395. Thompson, 8 Ind. Cis. Comm. at 29.
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California, the Indian lands became part of the public domain. ' 396
The findings of the Claims Commission were never appealed and
the claim was later settled. 397 These findings and the later judgments
rendered by the Commission embraced, by necessity, all of the In-
dians of California and all aboriginal lands in the State.398 This fur-
ther confirms that aboriginal title to all lands in California has been
extinguished. The Indians of California ratified this conclusion in Sec-
tion 4 of the "Stipulation for Compromise and Settlement and Entry
of Final Judgment" in Thompson v. United States:
The stipulation and entry of final judgment shall finally dispose of
all claims or demands which any of the petitioners and claimants
represented in any of said dockets . . . have asserted or could have
asserted against defendant in any of said cases, either before or after
consolidation, and petitioners (and all claimants represented thereby),
and each of them, shall be barred from asserting all such claims
or demands in any future action.
399
The finality of this stipulation is reinforced by the statutory finali-
ty accorded to all claims adjudicated by the Claims Commission.""0
Since payment has been made,"0 ' there is no room to argue that
aboriginal title in the Indians of California has remained
unextinguished, 0 2 nor may the Indians of California now relitigate
that claim. 3 Even after the Claims Commission proceeding, however,
the proposition that aboriginal title still exists in California has been
asserted.
3. Recent Developments
In Donahue v. Butz,404 plaintiffs were twenty-five members of an
unorganized band of Karuk Indians. They alleged occupancy of cer-
396. Id. at 30.
397. See Thompson, 13 Ind. Cls. Comm. at 543.
398. See supra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
399. Thompson, 13 Ind. Cls. Com. at 385-86.
400. 25 U.S.C. §70(u).
401. 25 U.S.C. §660; See 25 U.S.C. §70u(a) (providing in part that "[w]hen the report
of the Commission determining any claimant to be entitled to recover has been filed with Con-
gress, such report shall have the effect of a final judgment of the Court of Claims . . .");
25 U.S.C. see 70u(b)(barring any future claim against the United States arising out of the con-
troversy). See also Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d
495, 497 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. den., 429 U.S. 885 (1976); Temoak Band of Western Shoshone
Indians, Nev. v. United States, 593 F.2d 994, 998(Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. den., sub. nom., Western
Shoshone Identifiable Group, v. United States, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
402. See United States v. Dann, 105 S. Ct. 1058, 1062 (1985) (Dann III) (overruling Dann
11, 706 F.2d at 927).
403. See Oglala Sioux Tribe, 722 F.2d at 1413-14.
404. 363 F. Supp. 1316.
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tain lands in northeastern Humboldt and southwestern Siskiyuo Coun-
ties, administered by the Secretary of the Interior as national forest
lands. Plaintiffs alleged that such lands had been ceded in a treaty
with the United States and that the United States maliciously refused
to submit the treaty for ratification '05 and instead induced the Karuks
to move off their lands. 06 Plaintiffs sought restoration of lands, not
specifically on the basis of aboriginal title, but based on the failure
of the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to perform their fiduciary
obligations to Indians as wards of the government.4"7
Although plaintiffs attempted to base a cause of action on a breach
of trust theory, the court was unable to find that the United States
recognized 0 8 the Karuks' right to some clearly defined area of land. 09
The court referred instead to the Land Claims Act and the 1928
Jurisdictional Act to show that Congress recognized any Indian title
in any clearly defined area of land within the national forest.4'0 Far
from evidencing an intent to recognize Indian title, the court decided
that the presence of these laws established that aboriginal title had
been extinguished.4 1
In United States v. Gemmill the Ninth Circuit was confronted direct-
ly with the issue of surviving aboriginal title in California in 1976.
Three Indians were convicted of theft of government property valued
at less than $100 for cutting and carrying away Christmas trees from
the Shasta Trinity National Forest.412 The Indians claimed they acted
under the authorization of the Pit River Indian Tribe of which they
were members, and which they contended had Indian title to the land
in question.' 3
In passing on this aboriginal title claim, the Ninth Circuit noted
at the outset "the relevant question is whether the governmental ac-
tion was intended to be a revocation of Indian occupancy rights, not
405. This treaty was one of the 18 unratified treaties. Id. at 1320 n.4.
406. Id. at 1318.
407. Id. at 1318, 1321.
408. The United States contended that the complaint raised non-judicial issues (the power
of the U.S. to extinguish title); that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
1928 Jurisdictional Act provided the means for the Indians of California to raise their claims;
and that the question of aboriginal title was res judicata by virtue of either the judgment rendered
in Super v. Work or Indians of California. Id. at 1319.
409. Id. at 1321-24.
410. Id. at 1322-23.
411. Id. at 1321.
412. See Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1146-47.
413. Id. at 1147. Several other Indians were convicted of illegal occupancy of the Lassen
National Forest in violation of closure orders issued by the Forest Supervisor; they also raised
the defense of aboriginal title. Id.
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whether the revocation was effected by permissible means.""' Since
no one was disputing that the Pit River Indians prior to 1850 had
aboriginal title, the only issue was whether that title had been
extinguished. '1 5
The court first considered whether the Land Claims Act had revoked
the right of occupancy of the Pit River Tribe. Noting defendants'
arguments that Indian title was not extinguished by the Act, the court
assumed arguendo that the 1851 Act was ambiguous as to
extinguishment. 1 6 The Court, however, found "a series of federal
actions subsequent to 1851 clearly demonstrate[d] that the Pit River
Indian title has been extinguished. 41 1 7
First, the Court noted that in the 1850's and 1860's the Govern-
ment undertook concentrated military action against the Pit River In-
dians and other tribes in the area. 18 The court rejected defendants'
contentions that their title survived because they were removed by
force, since an extinguishment by force is effective.4"9 Second, the
court found that the claimed land was included in National Forest
reserves and the continuous use of the land for conservation and recrea-
tion left "little doubt" that Indian title was extinguished. 2 ' Finally,
any ambiguity about extinguishment was 'decisively resolved' by con-
gressional payment of compensation to the Pit River Indians in the
Claims Commission.'
California courts have also recently considered the question of the
continuing viability of claims of aboriginal rights. In In Re Wilson, 22
a Pit River Indian claimed he was exempt from California hunting
regulations, because, as a member of the Pit River tribe, he held unex-
tinguished aboriginal hunting rights.423 After noting that it was
"6... established that the tribe's aboriginal 'right to occupy' their native
territory has been extinguished. .. , the California Supreme Court
found that aboriginal hunting rights were incidents of aboriginal title
and likewise extinguished. 25
414. Id. at 1148.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1148.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1148-49.
421. Id. at 1149.
422. In re Wilson, 30 Cal. 3d 21, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336, (1981).
423. Id. at 23, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
424. Id. at 24, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
425. Id. at 25-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 338-45. Federal courts agree. See United States v. Min-
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As seen above, the specific factual findings made in cases42 6 that
have considered the effect of the federal government's long course
of treatment of the land title claims of the Indians of California,
provide an additional and considerable obstacle to future claims of
aboriginal title. Future aboriginal title claimants must not only show
that no extinguishment has been effected in fact, despite almost 100
years of case law and conduct of the United States to the contrary,
but the claimants must also dissociate themselves from the legal
finality of the prior judgments. Recent cases in which plaintiff tribes
have sought, unsuccessfully, to escape the effect of such prior
judgments or proceedings show the futility of attempting to overcome
the finality of prior judgments.
In Andrade v. United States, a tribe of Indians attempted to over-
turn the settlement approved and judgment rendered by the Claims
Commission in Thompson v. United States.127 The Indians challenged
the propriety of the procedures through which the settlement was
presented and also claimed inadequate representation.428 Stating that
the claims of the tribe ". . . would normally be barred by resjudicata
and by 25 U.S.C. sec. 70u, which established a final determination
of the Commission, filed with Congress, as having the same effect
as a final judgment of this Court," the Court of Claims considered
the challenge as independent action seeking relief from the judgment.4 29
Although the Court of Claims held that the suit was barred because
nesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd. 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
den. sub nom, Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 449 U.S. 905 (1980) (relin-
quishment by treaty includes rights to fish, etc.); Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v.
Bateman, 655 F.2d 176, 180-181 (9th Cir. 1981) (payment in settlement of all claims for lands
in unratified treaty also extinguished fishing rights).
426. In one unreported case, Judge David Williams of the U.S. District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California recently dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted claims of aboriginal title:
The [Indians] did not file a claim [pursuant to the Land Claims Act]. Any rights
that the [Indians] may have had was then extinguished by their failure to proceed
with a timely claim in accordance with the requirements of the [Private Land Claims
Act]. See, e.g., Summa Corp. v. California, . . . Barker v. Harvey . . The State
of California received absolute title to the tidal and submerged lands . . . That title
is grounded in the state [sic] constitution, and it has been confirmed and ratified
by later federal legislation and Supreme Court decrees.
United States of America ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, No. CV 84-4144-DWW (C.D. Cal. 1984)
Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, p. 3, app. docketed, No. 85-5508 (9th Circ.
1985).
427. 485 F.2d at 661, cert. den., sum. nom., Pitt River Tribe v. United States, 419 U.S.
831 (1974).
428. Id. at 661-62.
429. Id. at 663.
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of the eight-year delay in bringing the suit,4 30 the court also found
on the merits that the tribe had not shown any wrongdoing in con-
juction with the negotiation or the approval of the settlement.4 3' Thus,
any attempt to overturn the 1964 settlement and to re-open the ques-
tion of the continued existence of aboriginal title in California would
appear to have a severely limited chance of success. Even that slim
hope has been dashed by the conclusion of an almost 35-year long
series of proceedings that concerned the aboriginal claims of the
Western Shoshone Tribe to lands in Nevada and California.
In 1951, the Western Shoshone Tribe presented a claim to the Claims
Commission for compensation for lands taken by the United States
in Nevada and California.432 After a lengthy proceeding, the Claims
Commission determined the aboriginal claims of the Shoshones had
been extinguished.43 3 In 1974, the Commission was about to establish
a final value for the lands taken when an association claiming to be
the representative of a majority of the members of the tribe attempted
to intervene and stay the proceedings. 434 The association's purpose
was to prevent payment of compensation for the Nevada lands based
on the justifiable fear that payment of compensation would bar the
future assertion of aboriginal title to the Nevada lands.4 3" The associa-
tion hoped to show that such title had never been extinguished.1
36
The same obstacle faced by the tribe in Andrade (and by any tribe
or group of Indians still wishing to raise claims that have been finally
decided by the Claims Commission) confronted the association in
Western Shoshone. Because of the delay4 37 in raising the claim, the
430. Id. at 664-665. The District of Columbia Circuit refused a similar challenge in Six
Nations Confederacy v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 996, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. den. 447 U.S. 922
(1980).
431. See Andrade, 485 F.2d at 664-665. In 1983, the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge
to the manner of distribution of the settlement fund. Angle, 709 F.2d at 577-78.
432. See Western Shoshone Legal Defense & Educ. Assn, 531 F.2d at 496.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 497.
435. Id.
436. Id. The association hoped to argue that aboriginal title to large portions of the land
in Nevada was not extinguished because a treaty provided the only method by which plaintiff's
aboriginal title might be extinguished and because the United States obtained and was holding
large quantities of former aboriginal lands of the plaintiff for purposes not authorized by the
treaty. See Western Shoshone Legal Reference and Educ. Assoc. v. United States, 35 Ind. Cis.
Com. 457, 471 (1975). The Claims Commission found and the association conceded that the
aboriginal title to California land also claimed by the Shoshones was extinguished in March,
1853. Western Shoshone, 531 F.2d at 496.
437. The attempt to intervene in 1974 came 23 years after the claim was filed, 12 years
after the Claims Commission found that title had been extinguished, 8 years after the parties
stipulated to a valuation date, and one and one-half years after the finding of a value of the
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Court of Claims refused to allow intervention. 438
The court also rejected the attempt of the association to displace
the plaintiff group as the exclusive representative of the Shoshones,
noting that Indian claims under the Indian Claims Commission Act
were unlike a class suit in that the position of each individual member
of the group need not be represented; only the group claim need be
put forward.439 However, in subsequent proceedings, the position of
the intervenors was ultimately adopted by the Shoshones and sought
recognition of Shoshone aboriginal title, not compensation for the
taking.440
The same approach was taken by individual members of the associa-
tion charged with trespass (illegal grazing) by the United States. The
individual Indians (the Danns) defended the criminal case on the basis
that the United States could not exclude them because they and the
Western Shoshones held beneficial ownership to the lands based on
unextinguished aboriginal title. 4' The District Court agreed with the
United States that the Danns were collaterally estopped from asser-
ting title by virtue of the Claims Commission finding that aboriginal
title was extinguished. 4 2 However, the Ninth Circuit held that not
only was the Claims Commission finding not "final" and thus not
a bar to the assertion of aboriginal ownership by the Danns, but that
the fact of extinguishment had never been litigated. '43 The case was
remanded. '
A year later, the Western Shoshone claim before the Claims Com-
mission was finally decided in Temoak Band of Western Shoshone
L, Nev. v. U.S. 45 The issue was whether money compensation should
be sought for the taking of the aboriginal lands or whether the Western
Shoshone could claim title to the land. The Western Shoshones sought
a stay of the Claims Commission proceeding to allow the claim of
aboriginal title to be asserted. 4 " The Court of Claims recognized that
land. Western Shoshone, 531 F.2d at 498. Furthermore, the association was aware of the adverse
position taken by its rival before the Claims Commission, and there was no adequate excuse
for the delay in intervening. Id.
438. Id. at 499.
439. Id. at 500-03.
440. See United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1978) (Dann 1).
441. Id. at 223.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 226.
444. Id.
445. 593 F.2d 994.
446. Id. at 995-96. However, even the association conceded that some land had been taken.
Id. at 997.
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the position of the Western Shoshones was a natural reaction to a
change in the legal climate, in which large aboriginal title claims have
been reported in litigation or favorably settled in contrast to mere
claims for money awards under the Indian Claims Commission Act.447
However, the Court held ". .. far too much water had gone under
the bridge . . .. We think the Commission effectuated the will of
Congress more perfectly by allowing this case to come to final judg-
ment, and we therefore affirm on appeal its decision not to
suspend.""' 8 The Court referred the Western Shoshone to Congress
if they desired to avert extinguishment of their claims by final pay-
ment from Congress. 49
In the meantime, the Dann case had continued. On remand, the
District Court, found for the United States, holding that the Danns
were collaterally estopped from raising the aboriginal title claim and
that the award approved in Temoak Band extinguished aboriginal
title. 5 The Ninth Circuit again reversed, first holding on the basis
of Dann I that the Danns were not collaterally estopped. 5' The Court
held that the bar provision of the Indian Claims Commission Act,
25 U.S.C. sec. 70u, was the exclusive bar provision and that no addi-
tional bar may arise from common law principles of res judicata.452
The Court reasoned:
Indian claims proceedings are highly extraordinary creatures of
statute. In the absence of a recognized tribal organization, they may
be brought by any member of an identifiable group of Indians on
behalf of all members. 25 U.S.C. sec. 70i (1976). There is no provi-
sion for members to opt out of the proceedings, as there is in the
case of class actions . . .. Congress was careful to delineate the man-
ner in which the judgments reached in these unusual proceedings
would be effectuated. We are reluctant to add to the statutory sanc-
tions. We conclude, therefore, that the bar arising from a favorable
claim determination takes effect upon the payment of the claim, pur-
suant to section 70u(a).4
447. Id. at 996.
448. Id. The award was certified to the General Accounting Office which had the effect
of automatically appropriating the amount of the award. 31 U.S.C. §724a; Dann XII, 105 S.
Ct. at 1061. In contrast to Claims Commission proceedings, the Supreme Court has just nar-
rowly held (5-4) that time will not bar a claim by Indians that their lands were taken in viola-
tion of the Non-Intercourse Act. County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1256-57.
449. Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at 999.
450. See Dann 1I, 706 F.2d at 923.
451. Id. at 924.
452. Id. Cf. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 722 F.2d at 1414; United States v. Southern Ute Tribe
or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 159-64 (1971).
453. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 924-25.
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The Court held that because "payment" had not been made, the Danns
could assert aboriginal title as a defense to the trespass charge."4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.4"
In a very recent decision, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit holding that "payment" had occurred and that the
Danns were barred from asserting tribal aboriginal rights as a defense
to the trespass charge."56 The Supreme Court found that the Indian
Claims Commission Act had two purposes: the chief purpose was to
dispose of the Indian claims problem with finality; the secondary pur-
pose was to transfer the responsibility of determining the merits of
Indian claims from Congress to the Claims Commission. 57 Both of
these purposes would be frustrated if the award were not held to be
final once certified by the Court of Claims.458
The consequences of the Western Shoshone and Dann proceedings
are devastating to those who would claim aboriginal title in California.
Future champions of aboriginal title will be unable to successfully
claim that the decisions of the Claims Commission in the case of
the California Indians should not be accorded finality, in light of
the rule that once an award has been certified, as is the case with
the Indians of California, the findings and decisions of the Claims
Commission are final. The Indian Claims Commission Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 70u) expresses the firm Congressional intention that once resolved,
these claims should not be relitigated, either before the Courts or in
Congress.45 9
CONCLUSION
The inherent deficiency with any future aboriginal title claim in
California is that California Indians, unlike the Indians of the eastern
United States, are able to point only to acts of the United States
as the reason they have been dispossessed. Such claims are bound
454. Id. at 927. The Court also found that aboriginal title had not been extinguished as
a matter of law as Congress had not shown a clear intention to permit extinguishment as a
result of any given piece of legislation. Id. at 928-33.
455. See 104 S. Ct. 2693 (1984).
456. See Dann III, 105 S. Ct. at 1062, 1065. In an interesting aside, the Supreme Court
noted, without deciding, that the Danns were not barred from asserting "individual aboriginal
rights." Id. at 1065. The other issues discussed in Dann H were not addressed by the Supreme
Court's opinion.
457. Id. at 1062-63.
458. Id. at 1063-64. By virtue of 31 U.S.C. §724a certification automatically appropriated
the amount of the award and deposited it for the tribe in an interest bearing account. Id. at 1061.
459. See, e.g., Andrade, 485 F.2d at 663; Dann III, 105 S. Ct. at 1063.
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to fail since the United States possesses the plenary power to displace
Indians from their lands, regardless of the means chosen to do so.
The cumulative effect of the various actions taken by the United States
inconsistent with the California Indians' right of possession has been
to extinguish aboriginal title. In fact, the accepted date of extinguish-
ment of aboriginal title in California was soon after California became
a state. 6 0
The history of the treatment of Indians in California by the federal
government is perhaps even more deplorable than the treatment
accorded Indians in any other part of this nation. Sadly, this course
of treatment makes inevitable the conclusion that the claims of Cali-
fornia Indians to their aboriginal lands are no longer viable in
California."'
At the heart of this undeniably harsh result is the doctrine of
aboriginal title itself. This doctrine has accorded the federal govern-
ment the unilateral and unreviewable power to terminate the aboriginal
possession of Indian homelands for whatever reasons, by whatever
means, and with no compensation whatsoever required. Nowhere is
460. For example, in the New York Indian cases, the Oneida tribe claimed unapproved
treaties were entered into with the State of New York after the enactment of the Non-Intercourse
Act. County of Oneida, 105 S. Ct. at 1249. As a matter of historical fact, California did
not engage in any remotely similar conduct with respect to California Indians. See supra notes
68-153 and accompanying text.
461. However, there may be one avenue for proving an aboriginal title claim - what the
Supreme Court vaguely referred to as "individual aboriginal title." Dann III, 105 S. Ct. at
1065. The Supreme Court relied on Cramer, 261 U.S. at 227 and Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 357-358.
Id. Cramer was the only case relied on by the Supreme Court which specifically discussed
"individual aboriginal title." Cramer, 261 U.S. at 227. Santa Fe, also cited by the Court,
did not discuss or concern "individual aboriginal title." Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 357-58. And
in Cramer, the facts established adverse possession rather than a permissive right of occupancy:
. [Als early as 1859 the Indians named lived with their parents upon the lands
described and had resided there continuously ever since; that they had under fence
between 150 and 175 acres in an irregularly shaped tract ..... portions of which
they had irrigated and cultivated; that they had constructed and maintained dwelling
houses and divers outbuildings, and actually resided upon the lands and improved
them for the purpose of making for themselves homes.
Cramer, 261 U.S. at 226. Indeed the Court found the possession was with the implied consent
of the United States, "was definite and substantial in character and open to observation."
Id. at 230. But acquiring property interests against the public domain by adverse possession
seems contrary to basic property law. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 39-49;
Sweeten v. United States, 684 F.2d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 1982); CAL. CIV. CODE §1007; People
v. Chambers, 37 Cal. 2d 552, 557, 233 P.2d 557, 560 (1951); Patton v. City of Los Angeles,
169 Cal. 521, 527, 147 P. 141, 143 (1915). However, an argument can be made that such
a right to occupancy against (federal) public lands can be rationalized since acquiesence by
the federal government to the occupancy is compatible with its plenary authority over Indians,
and such occupancy can later be terminated by the federal government at any time. Such a
rationale would plainly have no application to state-owned lands because of the state's limited
authority to deal with the Indians.
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the extent of this power more evident than the manner in which the
power was exercised in California. By the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, the federal government solemnly promised to protect Mex-
ican landowners in their ownership of property; this promise was
fulfilled in the Land Claims Act. As for Indians living contem-
poraneously in the state, this promise was false; no effort was made
by the United States to protect them. Instead, an unstated but
undeniable policy of prompt removal of Indians from their lands to
avoid conflicts and interference with the Gold Rush was undertaken
by the federal government. This policy was fully within the power
of the United States. Given this extraordinary power and the will-
ingness to exercise the power, the conclusion that aboriginal title has
been extinguished is not remarkable.
Although the Land Claims Act provides a complete answer to the
question of extinguishment, extinguishment also was accomplished by
the "century-long course of conduct" by the Federal Government
repugnant to Indian occupancy, as well as the general acquiescence
of the government in the Indians' loss of their aboriginal lands. Of
course, the judgment and payment of the Claims Commission award
settled the issue of extinguishment in the very real legal sense of finality
of judgments and not only as a matter of history.
Despite the inevitable conclusion that aboriginal title has been
extinguished, the issue is still not a dead letter. Even if not raised
in the context of a suit to recover for loss of aboriginal lands as
in the Maine litigation, claims of aboriginal title are likely to recur
in cases (as in Gemmill, Wilson and Dann) where aboriginal title is
used as a defense to a charge of trespass or illegal hunting or fishing.
No doubt claims of aboriginal title will continue to be raised in other
contexts as well. Even if they have little chance of success, such claims
will nevertheless serve as a reminder of events that should not go
unnoticed or be forgotten by future generations.
